INTRODUCTION

1. The Industrial Revolution and its consequences have
been a disaster for the human race. They have greatly
increased the life-expectancy of those of us who live in
“advanced” countries, but they have destabilized society,
have made life unfulfilling, have subjected human beings
to indignities, have led to widespread psychological suffe¬
ring (in the Third World to physical suffering as well) and
have inflicted severe damage on the natural world. The
continued development of technology will worsen the si¬
tuation. It will certainly subject human being to greater in¬
dignities and inflict greater damage on the natural world,
it will probably lead to greater social disruption and psy¬
chological suffering, and it may lead to increased physical
suffering even in “advanced” countries.

2. The industrial-technological system may survive or it
may break down. If it survives, it MAY eventually achieve
a low level of physical and psychological suffering, but
only after passing through a long and very painful period
of adjustment and only at the cost of permanently redu¬
cing human beings and many other living organisms to
engineered products and mere cogs in the social machine.
Furthermore, if the system survives, the consequences will
be inevitable: There is no way of reforming or modifying
the system so as to prevent it from depriving people of
dignity and autonomy.
3. If the system breaks down the consequences will still
be very painful. But the bigger the system grows the more
disastrous the results of its breakdown will be, so if it is
to break down it had best break down sooner rather than
later.

4. We therefore advocate a revolution against the in¬
dustrial system. This revolution may or may not make use
of violence; it may be sudden or it may be a relatively
gradual process spanning a few decades. We can’t predict
any of that. But we do outline in a very general way the
measures that those who hate the industrial system should
take in order to prepare the way for a revolution against
that form of society. This is not to be a POLITICAL revo¬
lution. Its object will be to overthrow not governments
but the economic and technological basis of the present
society.

5. In this article we give attention to only some of
the negative developments that have grown out of the
industrial-technological system. Other such developments
we mention only briefly or ignore altogether. This does not


mean that we regard these other developments as unim¬
portant. For practical reasons we have to confine our dis¬
cussion to areas that have received insufficient public at¬
tention or in which we have something new to say. For
example, since there are well-developed environmental
and wilderness movements, we have written very little
about environmental degradation or the destruction of
wild nature, even though we consider these to be highly
important.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MODERN LEFTISM

6. Almost everyone will agree that we live in a deeply
troubled society. One of the most widespread manifesta¬
tions of the craziness of our world is leftism, so a discus¬
sion of the psychology of leftism can serve as an introduc¬
tion to the discussion of the problems of modern society
in general.

7. But what is leftism? During the first half of the 20th
century leftism could have been practically identified with
socialism. Today the movement is fragmented and it is not
clear who can properly be called a leftist. When we speak
of leftists in this article we have in mind mainly socialists,
collectivists, “politically correct” t 5 q)es, feminists, gay and
disability activists, animal rights activists and the like. But
not everyone who is associated with one of these move¬
ments is a leftist. What we are trying to get at in discus¬
sing leftism is not so much movement or an ideology as a
psychological t 5 q)e, or rather a collection of related types.
Thus, what we mean by “leftism” will emerge more clearly
in the course of our discussion of leftist psychology. (Also,
see paragraphs 227-230.)

8. Even so, our conception of leftism will remain a good
deal less clear than we would wish, but there doesn’t seem
to be any remedy for this. All we are trying to do here is
indicate in a rough and approximate way the two psycho¬
logical tendencies that we believe are the main driving
force of modern leftism. We by no means claim to be tel¬
ling the WHOLE truth about leftist psychology. Also, our
discussion is meant to apply to modern leftism only. We
leave open the question of the extent to which our discus¬
sion could be applied to the leftists of the 19th and early
20th centuries.
9. The two psychological tendencies that underlie mo¬
dern leftism we call “feelings of inferiority” and “over¬
socialization”. Eeelings of inferiority are characteristic of
modern leftism as a whole, while oversocialization is cha¬
racteristic only of a certain segment of modern leftism;
but this segment is highly influential.


FEELINGS OF INFERIORITY

10. By “feelings of inferiority” we mean not only infe¬
riority feelings in the strict sense but a whole spectrum
of related traits; low self-esteem, feelings of powerless¬
ness, depressive tendencies, defeatism, guilt, self-hatred.


1



etc. We argue that modern leftists tend to have some such
feelings (possibly more or less repressed) and that these
feelings are decisive in determining the direction of mo¬
dern leftism.

11. When someone interprets as derogatory almost any¬
thing that is said about him (or about groups with whom
he identifies) we conclude that he has inferiority feelings
or low self-esteem. This tendency is pronounced among
minority rights activists, whether or not they belong to the
minority groups whose rights they defend. They are hy¬
persensitive about the words used to designate minorities
and about anything that is said concerning minorities. The
terms “negro”, “oriental”, “handicapped” or “chick” for an
African, an Asian, a disabled person or a woman origi¬
nally had no derogatory connotation. “Broad” and “chick”
were merely the feminine equivalents of “guy”, “dude” or
“fellow”. The negative connotations have been attached
to these terms by the activists themselves. Some animal
rights activists have gone so far as to reject the word
“pet” and insist on its replacement by “animal compa¬
nion”. Leftish anthropologists go to great lengths to avoid
saying anything about primitive peoples that could concei¬
vably be interpreted as negative. They want to replace the
word “primitive” by “nonliterate”. They seem almost para¬
noid about anything that might suggest that any primitive
culture is inferior to our own. (We do not mean to imply
that primitive cultures ARE inferior to ours. We merely
point out the hyper sensitivity of leftish anthropologists.)

12. Those who are most sensitive about “politically in¬
correct” terminology are not the average black ghetto-
dweller, Asian immigrant, abused woman or disabled per¬
son, but a minority of activists, many of whom do not
even belong to any “oppressed” group but come from
privileged strata of society. Political correctness has its
stronghold among university professors, who have secure
employment with comfortable salaries, and the majority
of whom are heterosexual white males from middle- to
upper-middle-class families.

13. Many leftists have an intense identification with the
problems of groups that have an image of being weak
(women), defeated (American Indians), repellent (homo¬
sexuals) or otherwise inferior. The leftists themselves feel
that these groups are inferior. They would never admit to
themselves that they have such feelings, but it is preci¬
sely because they do see these groups as inferior that they
identify with their problems. (We do not mean to suggest
that women, Indians, etc. ARE inferior; we are only ma¬
king a point about leftist psychology.)

14. Feminists are desperately anxious to prove that wo¬
men are as strong and as capable as men. Clearly they are
nagged by a fear that women may NOT be as strong and
as capable as men.

15. Leftists tend to hate anything that has an image
of being strong, good and successful. They hate America,
they hate Western civilization, they hate white males, they
hate rationality. The reasons that leftists give for hating
the West, etc. clearly do not correspond with their real
motives. They SAY they hate the West because it is war¬
like, imperialistic, sexist, ethnocentric and so forth, but
where these same faults appear in socialist countries or


in primitive cultures, the leftist finds excuses for them,
or at best he GRUDGINGLY admits that they exist; whe¬
reas he ENTHUSIASTICALLY points out (and often greatly
exaggerates) these faults where they appear in Western
civilization. Thus it is clear that these faults are not the
leftist’s real motive for hating America and the West. He
hates America and the West because they are strong and
successful.

16. Words like “self-confidence”, “self-reliance”, “ini¬
tiative”, “enterprise”, “optimism”, etc., play little role
in the liberal and leftist vocabulary. The leftist is anti-
individualistic, pro-collectivist. He wants society to solve
every one’s problems for them, satisfy everyone’s needs
for them, take care of them. He is not the sort of person
who has an inner sense of confidence in his ability to solve
his own problems and satisfy his own needs. The leftist is
antagohistic to the concept of competition because, deep
inside, he feels like a loser.

17. Art forms that appeal to modern leftish intellec¬
tuals tend to focus on sordidness, defeat and despair, or
else they take an orgiastic tone, throwing off rational
control as if there were no hope of accomplishing any¬
thing through rational calculation and all that was left was
to immerse oneself in the sensations of the moment.

18. Modern leftish philosophers tend to dismiss reason,
science, objective reality and to insist that everything is
culturally relative. It is true that one can ask serious ques¬
tions about the foundations of scientific knowledge and
about how, if at all, the concept of objective reality can
be defined. But it is obvious that modern leftish philoso¬
phers are not simply cool-headed logicians systematically
analyzing the foundations of knowledge. They are deeply
involved emotionally in their attack on truth and reality.
They attack these concepts because of their own psycho¬
logical needs. For one thing, their attack is an outlet for
hostility, and, to the extent that it is successful, it satis¬
fies the drive for power. More importantly, the leftist hates
science and rationality because they classify certain beliefs
as true (i.e., successful, superior) and other beliefs as false
(i.e., failed, inferior). The leftist’s feelings of inferiority
run so deep that he cannot tolerate any classification of
some things as successful or superior and other things as
failed or inferior. This also underlies the rejection by many
leftists of the concept of mental illness and of the utility of
IQ tests. Leftists are antagonistic to genetic explanations
of human abilities or behavior because such explanations
tend to make some persons appear superior or inferior to
others. Leftists prefer to give society the credit or blame
for an individual’s ability or lack of it. Thus if a person is
“inferior” it is not his fault, but society’s, because he has
not been brought up properly.

19. The leftist is not t5q3ically the kind of person whose
feelings of inferiority make him a braggart, an egotist, a
bully, a self-promoter, a ruthless competitor. This kind of
person has not wholly lost faith in himself. He has a de¬
ficit in his sense of power and self-worth, but he can still
conceive of himself as having the capacity to be strong,
and his efforts to make himself strong produce his un¬
pleasant behavior. [1] But the leftist is too far gone for
that. His feelings of inferiority are so ingrained that he


2



cannot conceive of himself as individually strong and va¬
luable. Hence the collectivism of the leftist. He can feel
strong only as a member of a large organization or a mass
movement with which he identifies himself.

20. Notice the masochistic tendency of leftist tactics.
Leftists protest by lying down in front of vehicles, they
intentionally provoke police or racists to abuse them, etc.
These tactics may often be effective, but many leftists use
them not as a means to an end but because they PREFER
masochistic tactics. Self-hatred is a leftist trait.

21. Leftists may claim that their activism is motivated
by compassion or by moral principles, and moral principle
does play a role for the leftist of the oversocialized t 5 ^e.
But compassion and moral principle cannot be the main
motives for leftist activism. Hostility is too prominent a
component of leftist behavior; so is the drive for power.
Moreover, much leftist behavior is not rationally calcula¬
ted to be of benefit to the people whom the leftists claim
to be trying to help. For example, if one believes that af¬
firmative action is good for black people, does it make
sense to demand affirmative action in hostile or dogmatic
terms? Obviously it would be more productive to take a
diplomatic and conciliatory approach that would make at
least verbal and symbolic concessions to white people who
think that affirmative action discriminates against them.
But leftist activists do not take such an approach because
it would not satisfy their emotional needs. Helping black
people is not their real goal. Instead, race problems serve
as an excuse for them to express their own hostility and
frustrated need for power. In doing so they actually harm
black people, because the activists’ hostile attitude toward
the white majority tends to intensify race hatred.

22. If our society had no social problems at all, the lef¬
tists would have to INVENT problems in order to provide
themselves with an excuse for making a fuss.

23. We emphasize that the foregoing does not pretend
to be an accurate description of everyone who might be
considered a leftist. It is only a rough indication of a ge¬
neral tendency of leftism.


OVERSOCIALIZATION

24. Psychologists use the term “socialization” to desi¬
gnate the process by which children are trained to think
and act as society demands. A person is said to be well
socialized if he believes in and obeys the moral code of
his society and fits in well as a functioning part of that
society. It may seem senseless to say that many leftists are
over-socialized, since the leftist is perceived as a rebel. Ne¬
vertheless, the position can be defended. Many leftists are
not such rebels as they seem.

25. The moral code of our society is so demanding that
no one can think, feel and act in a completely moral way.
For example, we are not supposed to hate anyone, yet
almost everyone hates somebody at some time or other,
whether he admits it to himself or not. Some people are
so highly socialized that the attempt to think, feel and
act morally imposes a severe burden on them. In order


to avoid feelings of guilt, they continually have to deceive
themselves about their own motives and find moral ex¬
planations for feelings and actions that in reality have a
nonmoral origin. We use the term “oversocialized” to des¬
cribe such people. [2]

26. Oversocialization can lead to low self-esteem, a
sense of powerlessness, defeatism, guilt, etc. One of the
most important means by which our society socializes
children is by making them feel ashamed of behavior or
speech that is contrary to society’s expectations. If this is
overdone, or if a particular child is especially susceptible
to such feelings, he ends by feeling ashamed of HIMSELF.
Moreover the thought and the behavior of the oversocia¬
lized person are more restricted by society’s expectations
than are those of the lightly socialized person. The majo¬
rity of people engage in a significant amount of naughty
behavior. They lie, they commit petty thefts, they break
traffic laws, they goof off at work, they hate someone, they
say spiteful things or they use some underhanded trick to
get ahead of the other guy. The oversocialized person can¬
not do these things, or if he does do them he generates
in himself a sense of shame and self-hatred. The over¬
socialized person cannot even experience, without guilt,
thoughts or feelings that are contrary to the accepted mo¬
rality; he cannot think “unclean” thoughts. And socializa¬
tion is not just a matter of morality; we are socialized to
conform to many norms of behavior that do not fall under
the heading of morality. Thus the oversocialized person is
kept on a psychological leash and spends his life running
on rails that society has laid down for him. In many over¬
socialized people this results in a sense of constraint and
powerlessness that can be a severe hardship. We suggest
that oversocialization is among the more serious cruelties
that human being inflict on one another.

27. We argue that a very important and influential seg¬
ment of the modern left is oversocialized and that their
oversocialization is of great importance in determining
the direction of modern leftism. Leftists of the overso¬
cialized type tend to be intellectuals or members of the
upper-middle class. Notice that university intellectuals [3]
constitute the most highly socialized segment of our so¬
ciety and also the most leftwing segment.

28. The leftist of the oversocialized type tries to get off
his psychological leash and assert his autonomy by rebel¬
ling. But usually he is not strong enough to rebel against
the most basic values of society. Generally speaking, the
goals of today’s leftists are NOT in conflict with the accep¬
ted morality. On the contrary, the left takes an accepted
moral principle, adopts it as its own, and then accuses
mainstream society of violating that principle. Examples:
racial equality, equality of the sexes, helping poor people,
peace as opposed to war, nonviolence generally, freedom
of expression, kindness to animals. More fundamentally,
the duty of the individual to serve society and the duty
of society to take care of the individual. All these have
been deeply rooted values of our society (or at least of its
middle and upper classes [4] for a long time. These va¬
lues are explicitly or implicitly expressed or presupposed
in most of the material presented to us by the mainstream
communications media and the educational system. Lef-


3



tists, especially those of the oversocialized t 3 Ape, usually
do not rebel against these principles but justify their hos¬
tility to society by claiming (with some degree of truth)
that society is not living up to these principles.

29. Here is an illustration of the way in which the over¬
socialized leftist shows his real attachment to the conven¬
tional attitudes of our society while pretending to be in
rebellion aginst it. Many leftists push for affirmative ac¬
tion, for moving black people into high-prestige jobs, for
improved education in black schools and more money for
such schools; the way of life of the black “underclass” they
regard as a social disgrace. They want to integrate the
black man into the system, make him a business execu¬
tive, a lawyer, a scientist just like upper-middle-class white
people. The leftists will reply that the last thing they want
is to make the black man into a copy of the white man; ins¬
tead, they want to preserve African American culture. But
in what does this preservation of African American culture
consist? It can hardly consist in anything more than ea¬
ting black-style food, listening to black-style music, wea¬
ring black-style clothing and going to a black-style church
or mosque. In other words, it can express itself only in su¬
perficial matters. In all ESSENTIAL respects most leftists
of the oversocialized type want to make the black man
conform to white, middle-class ideals. They want to make
him study technical subjects, become an executive or a
scientist, spend his life climbing the status ladder to prove
that black people are as good as white. They want to make
black fathers “responsible,” they want black gangs to be¬
come nonviolent, etc. But these are exactly the values of
the industrial- technological system. The system couldn’t
care less what kind of music a man listens to, what kind
of clothes he wears or what religion he believes in as long
as he studies in school, holds a respectable job, climbs the
status ladder, is a “responsible” parent, is nonviolent and
so forth. In effect, however much he may deny it, the over¬
socialized leftist wants to integrate the black man into the
system and make him adopt its values.

30. We certainly do not claim that leftists, even of the
oversocialized type, NEVER rebel against the fundamen¬
tal values of our society. Clearly they sometimes do. Some
oversocialized leftists have gone so far as to rebel against
one of modern society’s most important principles by en¬
gaging in physical violence. By their own account, vio¬
lence is for them a form of “liberation.” In other words,
by committing violence they break through the psycholo¬
gical restraints that have been trained into them. Because
they are oversocialized these restraints have been more
confining for them than for others; hence their need to
break free of them. But they usually justify their rebellion
in terms of mainstream values. If they engage in violence
they claim to be fighting against racism or the like.

31. We realize that many objections could be raised to
the foregoing thumbnail sketch of leftist psychology. The
real situation is complex, and anything like a complete
description of it would take several volumes even if the
necessary data were available. We claim only to have in¬
dicated very roughly the two most important tendencies
in the psychology of modern leftism.

32. The problems of the leftist are indicative of the pro¬


blems of our society as a whole. Low self-esteem, depres¬
sive tendencies and defeatism are not restricted to the left.
Though they are especially noticeable in the left, they are
widespread in our society. And today’s society tries to so¬
cialize us to a greater extent than any previous society. We
are even told by experts how to eat, how to exercise, how
to make love, how to raise our kids and so forth.


THE POWER PROCESS

33. Human beings have a need (probably based in bio¬
logy) for something that we will call the power process.
This is closely related to the need for power (which is
widely recognized) but is not quite the same thing. The
power process has four elements. The three most clear-
cut of these we call goal, effort and attainment of goal.
(Everyone needs to have goals whose attainment requires
effort, and needs to succeed in attaining at least some of
his goals.) The fourth element is more difficult to define
and may not be necessary for everyone. We call it auto¬
nomy and will discuss it later (paragraphs 42-44).

34. Consider the hypothetical case of a man who can
have an 3 n;hing he wants just by wishing for it. Such a man
has power, but he will develop serious psychological pro¬
blems. At first he will have a lot of fun, but by and by he
will become acutely bored and demoralized. Eventually he
may become clinically depressed. History shows that leisu¬
red aristocracies tend to become decadent. This is not true
of fighting aristocracies that have to struggle to maintain
their power. But leisured, secure aristocracies that have no
need to exert themselves usually become bored, hedonis¬
tic and demoralized, even though they have power. This
shows that power is not enough. One must have goals to¬
ward which to exercise one’s power.

35. Everyone has goals; if nothing else, to obtain the
physical necessities of life: food, water and whatever clo¬
thing and shelter are made necessary by the climate. But
the leisured aristocrat obtains these things without effort.
Hence his boredom and demoralization.

36. Nonattainment of important goals results in death
if the goals are physical necessities, and in frustration if
non-attainment of the goals is compatible with survival.
Consistent failure to attain goals throughout life results in
defeatism, low self-esteem or depression.

37. Thus, in order to avoid serious psychological pro¬
blems, a human being needs goals whose attainment re¬
quires effort, and he must have a reasonable rate of suc¬
cess in attaining his goals.


SURROGATE ACTIVITIES

38. But not every leisured aristocrat becomes bored and
demoralized. Eor example, the emperor Hirohito, instead
of sinking into decadent hedonism, devoted himself to
marine biology, a field in which he became distinguished.
When people do not have to exert themselves to satisfy


4



their physical needs they often set up artificial goals for
themselves. In many cases they then pursue these goals
with the same energy and emotional involvement that
they otherwise would have put into the search for physi¬
cal necessities. Thus the aristocrats of the Roman Empire
had their literary pretensions; many European aristocrats
a few centuries ago invested tremendous time and energy
in hunting, though they certainly didn’t need the meat;
other aristocracies have competed for status through ela¬
borate displays of wealth; and a few aristocrats, like Hiro-
hito, have turned to science.

39. We use the term “surrogate activity’ to designate
an activity that is directed toward an artificial goal that
people set up for themselves merely in order to have some
goal to work toward, or let us say, merely for the qake
of the “fulfillment” that they get from pursuing the goal.
Here is a rule of thumb for the identification of surro¬
gate activities. Given a person who devotes much time
and energy to the pursuit of goal X, ask yourself this: If
he had to devote most of his time and energy to satisfying
his biological needs, and if that effort required him to use
his physical and mental faculties in a varied and interes¬
ting way, would he feel seriously deprived because he did
not attain goal X? If the answer is no, then the person’s
pursuit of goal X is a surrogate activity. Hirohito’s studies
in marine biology clearly constituted a surrogate activity,
since it is pretty certain that if Hirohito had had to spend
his time working at interesting non-scientific tasks in or¬
der to obtain the necessities of life, he would not have
felt deprived because he didn’t know all about the ana¬
tomy and life-cycles of marine animals. On the other hand
the pursuit of sex and love (for example) is not a surro¬
gate activity, because most people, even if their existence
were otherwise satisfactory, would feel deprived if they
passed their lives without ever having a relationship with
a member of the opposite sex. (But pursuit of an exces¬
sive amount of sex, more than one really needs, can be a
surrogate activity.)

40. In modern industrial society only minimal effort
is necessary to satisfy one’s physical needs. It is enough
to go through a training program to acquire some petty
technical skill, then come to work on time and exert the
very modest effort needed to hold a job. The only requi¬
rements are a moderate amount of intelligence and, most
of all, simple OBEDIENCE. If one has those, society takes
care of one from cradle to grave. (Yes, there is an under¬
class that cannot take the physical necessities for granted,
but we are speaking here of mainstream society.) Thus it
is not surprising that modern society is full of surrogate
activities. These include scientific work, athletic achieve¬
ment, humanitarian work, artistic and literary creation,
climbing the corporate ladder, acquisition of money and
material goods far beyond the point at which they cease
to give any additional physical satisfaction, and social ac¬
tivism when it addresses issues that are not important for
the activist personally, as in the case of white activists who
work for the rights of nonwhite minorities. These are not
always PURE surrogate activities, since for many people
they may be motivated in part by needs other than the
need to have some goal to pursue. Scientific work may be


motivated in part by a drive for prestige, artistic creation
by a need to express feelings, militant social activism by
hostility. But for most people who pursue them, these ac¬
tivities are in large part surrogate activities. Eor example,
the majority of scientists will probably agree that the “ful¬
fillment” they get from their work is more important than
the money and prestige they earn.

41. Eor many if not most people, surrogate activities are
less satisfying than the pursuit of real goals (that is, goals
that people would want to attain even if their need for the
power process were already fulfilled). One indication of
this is the fact that, in many or most cases, people who
are deeply involved in surrogate activities are never sa¬
tisfied, never at rest. Thus the money-maker constantly
strives for more and more wealth. The scientist no soo¬
ner solves one problem than he moves on to the next. The
long-distance runner drives himself to run always farther
and faster. Many people who pursue surrogate activities
will say that they get far more fulfillment from these ac¬
tivities than they do from the “mundane” business of sa¬
tisfying their biological needs, but that is because in our
society the effort needed to satisfy the biological needs
has been reduced to triviality. More importantly, in our
society people do not satisfy their biological needs AUTO¬
NOMOUSLY but by functioning as parts of an immense
social machine. In contrast, people generally have a great
deal of autonomy in pursuing their surrogate activities.


AUTONOMY

42. Autonomy as a part of the power process may not
be necessary for every individual. But most people need
a greater or lesser degree of autonomy in working to¬
ward their goals. Their efforts must be undertaken on
their own initiative and must be under their own direc¬
tion and control. Yet most people do not have to exert this
initiative, direction and control as single individuals. It is
usually enough to act as a member of a SMALL group.
Thus if half a dozen people discuss a goal among them¬
selves and make a successful joint effort to attain that
goal, their need for the power process will be served. But
if they work under rigid orders handed down from above
that leave them no room for autonomous decision and ini¬
tiative, then their need for the power process will not be
served. The same is true when decisions are made on a
collective basis if the group making the collective decision
is so large that the role of each individual is insignificant.
[5]

43. It is true that some individuals seem to have little
need for autonomy. Either their drive for power is weak or
they satisfy it by identifying themselves with some power¬
ful organization to which they belong. And then there are
unthinking, animal t5q5es who seem to be satisfied with a
purely physical sense of power (the good combat soldier,
who gets his sense of power by developing fighting skills
that he is quite content to use in blind obedience to his
superiors).


5



44. But for most people it is through the power process
— having a goal, making an AUTONOMOUS effort and
attaining the goal — that self-esteem, self-confidence and
a sense of power are acquired. When one does not have
adequate opportunity to go through the power process the
consequences are (depending on the individual and on
the way the power process is disrupted) boredom, demo¬
ralization, low self-esteem, inferiority feelings, defeatism,
depression, anxiety, guilt, frustration, hostility, spouse or
child abuse, insatiable hedonism, abnormal sexual beha¬
vior, sleep disorders, eating disorders, etc. [6]


SOURCES OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

45. Any of the foregoing s 3 miptoms can occur in any
society, but in modern industrial society they are present
on a massive scale. We aren’t the first to mention that the
world today seems to be going crazy. This sort of thing is
not normal for human societies. There is good reason to
believe that primitive man suffered from less stress and
frustration and was better satisfied with his way of life
than modern man is. It is true that not all was sweet¬
ness and light in primitive societies. Abuse of women was
common among the Australian aborigines, transexuality
was fairly common among some of the American Indian
tribes. But it does appear that GENERALLY SPEAKING the
kinds of problems that we have listed in the preceding pa¬
ragraph were far less common among primitive peoples
than they are in modern society.

46. We attribute the social and psychological problems
of modern society to the fact that that society requires
people to live under conditions radically different from
those under which the human race evolved and to be¬
have in ways that conflict with the patterns of behavior
that the human race developed while living under the
earlier conditions. It is clear from what we have already
written that we consider lack of opportunity to properly
experience the power process as the most important of
the abnormal conditions to which modern society subjects
people. But it is not the only one. Before dealing with dis¬
ruption of the power process as a source of social pro¬
blems we will discuss some of the other sources.

47. Among the abnormal conditions present in modern
industrial society are excessive density of population, iso¬
lation of man from nature, excessive rapidity of social
change and the breakdown of natural small-scale commu¬
nities such as the extended family, the village or the tribe.

48. It is well known that crowding increases stress and
aggression. The degree of crowding that exists today and
the isolation of man from nature are consequences of tech¬
nological progress. All pre-industrial societies were pre¬
dominantly rural. The Industrial Revolution vastly increa¬
sed the size of cities and the proportion of the population
that lives in them, and modern agricultural technology
has made it possible for the Earth to support a far den¬
ser population than it ever did before. (Also, technology
exacerbates the effects of crowding because it puts increa¬
sed disruptive powers in people’s hands. Eor example, a


variety of noise-making devices: power mowers, radios,
motorcycles, etc. If the use of these devices is unrestric¬
ted, people who want peace and quiet are frustrated by
the noise. If their use is restricted, people who use the
devices are frustrated by the regulations. But if these ma¬
chines had never been invented there would have been no
conflict and no frustration generated by them.)

49. For primitive societies the natural world (which
usually changes only slowly) provided a stable framework
and therefore a sense of security. In the modern world it
is human society that dominates nature rather than the
other way around, and modern society changes very ra¬
pidly owing to technological change. Thus there is no
stable framework.

50. The conservatives are fools: They whine about the
decay of traditional values, yet they enthusiastically sup¬
port technological progress and economic growth. Appa¬
rently it never occurs to them that you can’t make rapid,
drastic changes in the technology and the economy of a
society without causing rapid changes in all other aspects
of the society as well, and that such rapid changes inevi¬
tably break down traditional values.

51. The breakdown of traditional values to some extent
implies the breakdown of the bonds that hold together
traditional small-scale social groups. The disintegration
of small-scale social groups is also promoted by the fact
that modern conditions often require or tempt individuals
to move to new locations, separating themselves from
their communities. Beyond that, a technological society
HAS TO weaken family ties and local communities if it is
to function efficiently. In modern society an individual’s
loyalty must be first to the system and only secondarily to
a smallscale community, because if the internal loyalties
of small-scale communities were stronger than loyalty to
the system, such communities would pursue their own ad¬
vantage at the expense of the system.

52. Suppose that a public official or a corporation exe¬
cutive appoints his cousin, his friend or his co-religionist
to a position rather than appointing the person best qua¬
lified for the job. He has permitted personal loyalty to su¬
persede his loyalty to the system, and that is “nepotism”
or “discrimination,” both of which are terrible sins in mo¬
dern society. Would-be industrial societies that have done
a poor job of subordinating personal or local loyalties to
loyalty to the system are usually very inefficient. (Look at
Latin America.) Thus an advanced industrial society can
tolerate only those small-scale communities that are emas¬
culated, tamed and made into tools of the system. [7]

53. Crowding, rapid change and the breakdown of com¬
munities have been widely recognized as sources of social
problems. But we do not believe they are enough to ac¬
count for the extent of the problems that are seen today.

54. A few pre-industrial cities were very large and crow¬
ded, yet their inhabitants do not seem to have suffered
from psychological problems to the same extent as mo¬
dern man. In America today there still are uncrowded ru¬
ral areas, and we find there the same problems as in urban
areas, though the problems tend to be less acute in the ru¬
ral areas. Thus crowding does not seem to be the decisive
factor.


6



55. On the growing edge of the American frontier du¬
ring the 19th century, the mobility of the population pro¬
bably broke down extended families and small-scale so¬
cial groups to at least the same extent as these are bro¬
ken down today. In fact, many nuclear families lived by
choice in such isolation, having no neighbors within seve¬
ral miles, that they belonged to no community at all, yet
they do not seem to have developed problems as a result.

56. Furthermore, change in American frontier society
was very rapid and deep. A man might be born and rai¬
sed in a log cabin, outside the reach of law and order and
fed largely on wild meat; and by the time he arrived at
old age he might be working at a regular job and living
in an ordered community with effective law enforcement.
This was a deeper change than that which typically occurs
in the life of a modern individual, yet it does not seem
to have led to psychological problems. In fact, 19th cen¬
tury American society had an optimistic and self-confident
tone, quite unlike that of today’s society. [8]

57. The difference, we argue, is that modern man has
the sense (largely justified) that change is IMPOSED on
him, whereas the 19th century frontiersman had the sense
(also largely justified) that he created change himself, by
his own choice. Thus a pioneer settled on a piece of land
of his own choosing and made it into a farm through his
own effort. In those days an entire county might have only
a couple of hundred inhabitants and was a far more iso¬
lated and autonomous entity than a modern county is.
Hence the pioneer farmer participated as a member of a
relatively small group in the creation of a new, ordered
community. One may well question whether the creation
of this community was an improvement, but at any rate it
satisfied the pioneer’s need for the power process.

58. It would be possible to give other examples of so¬
cieties in which there has been rapid change and/or lack
of close community ties without the kind of massive beha¬
vioral aberration that is seen in today’s industrial society.
We contend that the most important cause of social and
psychological problems in modern society is the fact that
people have insufficient opportunity to go through the po¬
wer process in a normal way. We don’t mean to say that
modern society is the only one in which the power process
has been disrupted. Probably most if not all civilized so¬
cieties have interfered with the power process to a greater
or lesser extent. But in modern industrial society the pro¬
blem has become particularly acute. Leftism, at least in its
recent (mid- to late-20th century) form, is in part a symp¬
tom of deprivation with respect to the power process.


DISRUPTION OF THE POWER PROCESS IN
MODERN SOCIETY

59. We divide human drives into three groups: (1) those
drives that can be satisfied with minimal effort; (2) those
that can be satisfied but only at the cost of serious effort;
(3) those that cannot be adequately satisfied no matter
how much effort one makes. The power process is the pro¬
cess of satisfying the drives of the second group. The more


drives there are in the third group, the more there is frus¬
tration, anger, eventually defeatism, depression, etc.

60. In modern industrial society natural human drives
tend to be pushed into the first and third groups, and the
second group tends to consist increasingly of artificially
created drives.

61. In primitive societies, physical necessities generally
fall into group 2: They can be obtained, but only at the
cost of serious effort. But modern society tends to gua¬
ranty the physical necessities to everyone [9] in exchange
for only minimal effort, hence physical needs are pushed
into group 1. (There may be disagreement about whether
the effort needed to hold a job is “minimal”; but usually,
in lower- to middle-level jobs, whatever effort is required
is merely that of OBEDIENCE. You sit or stand where you
are told to sit or stand and do what you are told to do in
the way you are told to do it. Seldom do you have to exert
yourself seriously, and in any case you have hardly any
autonomy in work, so that the need for the power process
is not well served.)

62. Social needs, such as sex, love and status, often re¬
main in group 2 in modern society, depending on the si¬
tuation of the individual. [10] But, except for people who
have a particularly strong drive for status, the effort re¬
quired to fulfill the social drives is insufficient to satisfy
adequately the need for the power process.

63. So certain artificial needs have been created that
fall into group 2, hence serve the need for the power pro¬
cess. Advertising and marketing techniques have been de¬
veloped that make many people feel they need things that
their grandparents never desired or even dreamed of. It
requires serious effort to earn enough money to satisfy
these artificial needs, hence they fall into group 2. (But see
paragraphs 80-82.) Modern man must satisfy his need for
the power process largely through pursuit of the artificial
needs created by the advertising and marketing industry
[11], and through surrogate activities.

64. It seems that for many people, maybe the majo¬
rity, these artificial forms of the power process are insuffi¬
cient. A theme that appears repeatediy in the writings of
the social critics of the second half of the 20th century is
the sense of purposelessness that afflicts many people in
modern society. (This purposelessness is often called by
other names such as “anomic” or “middle-class vacuity.”)
We suggest that the so-called “identity crisis” is actually
a search for a sense of purpose, often for commitment to
a suitable surrogate activity. It may be that existentialism
is in large part a response to the purposelessness of mo¬
dern life. [12] Very widespread in modern society is the
search for “fulfillment.” But we think that for the majority
of people an activity whose main goal is fulfillment (that
is, a surrogate activity) does not bring completely satis¬
factory fulfillment. In other words, it does not fully satisfy
the need for the power process. (See paragraph 41.) That
need can be fully satisfied only through activities that have
some external goal, such as physical necessities, sex, love,
status, revenge, etc.

65. Moreover, where goals are pursued through earning
money, climbing the status ladder or functioning as part of
the system in some other way, most people are not in a po-


7



sition to pursue their goals AUTONOMOUSLY. Most wor¬
kers are someone else’s employee and, as we pointed out
in paragraph 61, must spend their days doing what they
are told to do in the way they are told to do it. Even most
people who are in business for themselves have only limi¬
ted autonomy. It is a chronic complaint of small-business
persons and entrepreneurs that their hands are tied by
excessive government regulation. Some of these regula¬
tions are doubtless unnecessary, but for the most part go¬
vernment regulations are essential and inevitable parts of
our extremely complex society. A large portion of small
business today operates on the franchise system. It was
reported in the Wall Street Journal a few years ago that
many of the franchise-granting companies require appli¬
cants for franchises to take a personality test that is de¬
signed to EXCLUDE those who have creativity and initia¬
tive, because such persons are not sufficiently docile to go
along obediently with the franchise system. This excludes
from small business many of the people who most need
autonomy.

66. Today people live more by virtue of what the sys¬
tem does FOR them or TO them than by virtue of what
they do for themselves. And what they do for themselves
is done more and more along channels laid down by the
system. Opportunities tend to be those that the system
provides, the opportunities must be exploited in accord
with rules and regulations [13], and techniques prescri¬
bed by experts must be followed if there is to be a chance
of success.

67. Thus the power process is disrupted in our society
through a deficiency of real goals and a deficiency of au¬
tonomy in the pursuit of goals. But it is also disrupted
because of those human drives that fall into group 3:
the drives that one cannot adequately satisfy no matter
how much effort one makes. One of these drives is the
need for security. Our lives depend on decisions made by
other people; we have no control over these decisions and
usually we do not even know the people who make them.
(“We live in a world in which relatively few people —
maybe 500 or 1,000 — make the important decisions”,
Philip B. He 3 miann of Harvard Law School, quoted by An¬
thony Lewis, New York Times, April 21, 1995.) Our lives
depend on whether safety standards at a nuclear power
plant are properly maintained; on how much pesticide is
allowed to get into our food or how much pollution into
our air; on how skillful (or incompetent) our doctor is;
whether we lose or get a job may depend on decisions
made by government economists or corporation execu¬
tives; and so forth. Most individuals are not in a position
to secure themselves against these threats to more [than]
a very limited extent. The individual’s search for security
is therefore frustrated, which leads to a sense of power¬
lessness.

68. It may be objected that primitive man is physically
less secure than modern man, as is shown by his shor¬
ter life expectancy; hence modern man suffers from less,
not more than the amount of insecurity that is normal for
human beings. But psychological security does not closely
correspond with physical security. What makes us FEEL se¬
cure is not so much objective security as a sense of confi¬


dence in our ability to take care of ourselves. Primitive
man, threatened by a fierce animal or by hunger, can fight
in self-defense or travel in search of food. He has no cer¬
tainty of success in these efforts, but he is by no means
helpless against the things that threaten him. The mo¬
dern individual on the other hand is threatened by many
things against which he is helpless: nuclear accidents, car¬
cinogens in food, environmental pollution, war, increasing
taxes, invasion of his privacy by large organizations, na¬
tionwide social or economic phenomena that may disrupt
his way of life.

69. It is true that primitive man is powerless against
some of the things that threaten him; disease for example.
But he can accept the risk of disease stoically. It is part of
the nature of things, it is no one’s fault, unless it is the fault
of some imaginary, impersonal demon. But threats to the
modern individual tend to be MAN-MADE. They are not
the results of chance but are IMPOSED on him by other
persons whose decisions he, as an individual, is unable
to influence. Consequently he feels frustrated, humiliated
and angry.

70. Thus primitive man for the most part has his se¬
curity in his own hands (either as an individual or as a
member of a SMALL group) whereas the security of mo¬
dern man is in the hands of persons or organizations that
are too remote or too large for him to be able personally to
influence them. So modern man’s drive for security tends
to fall into groups 1 and 3; in some areas (food, shelter
etc.) his security is assured at the cost of only trivial ef¬
fort, whereas in other areas he CANNOT attain security.
(The foregoing greatly simplifies the real situation, but it
does indicate in a rough, general way how the condition
of modern man differs from that of primitive man.)

71. People have many transitory drives or impulses that
are necessarily frustrated in modern life, hence fall into
group 3. One may become angry, but modern society can¬
not permit fighting. In many situations it does not even
permit verbal aggression. When going somewhere one
may be in a hurry, or one may be in a mood to travel
slowly, but one generally has no choice but to move with
the flow of traffic and obey the traffic signals. One may
want to do one’s work in a different way, but usually one
can work only according to the rules laid down by one’s
employer. In many other ways as well, modern man is
strapped down by a network of rules and regulations (ex¬
plicit or implicit) that frustrate many of his impulses and
thus interfere with the power process. Most of these regu¬
lations cannot be dispensed with, because they are neces¬
sary for the functioning of industrial society.

72. Modern society is in certain respects extremely per¬
missive. In matters that are irrelevant to the functioning
of the system we can generally do what we please. We
can believe in any religion (as long as it does not encou¬
rage behavior that is dangerous to the system). We can
go to bed with anyone we like (as long as we practice
“safe sex”). We can do anything we like as long as it is
UNIMPORTANT. But in all IMPORTANT matters the sys¬
tem tends increasingly to regulate our behavior.

73. Behavior is regulated not only through explicit rules
and not only by the government. Control is often exer-


8



cised through indirect coercion or through psychological
pressure or manipulation, and by organizations other than
the government, or by the system as a whole. Most large
organizations use some form of propaganda [14] to ma¬
nipulate public attitudes or behavior. Propaganda is not
limited to “commercials” and advertisements, and some¬
times it is not even consciously intended as propaganda
by the people who make it. For instance, the content of
entertainment programming is a powerful form of propa¬
ganda. An example of indirect coercion: There is no law
that says we have to go to work every day and follow our
employer’s orders. Legally there is nothing to prevent us
from going to live in the wild like primitive people or from
going into business for ourselves. But in practice there is
very little wild country left, and there is room in the eco¬
nomy for only a limited number of small business owners.
Hence most of us can survive only as someone else’s em¬
ployee.

74. We suggest that modern man’s obsession with lon¬
gevity, and with maintaining physical vigor and sexual at¬
tractiveness to an advanced age, is a symptom of unful¬
fillment resulting from deprivation with respect to the po¬
wer process. The “mid-lffe crisis” also is such a symptom.
So is the lack of interest in having children that is fairly
common in modern society but almost unheard-of in pri¬
mitive societies.

75. In primitive societies life is a succession of stages.
The needs and purposes of one stage having been ful¬
filled, there is no particular reluctance about passing on
to the next stage. A young man goes through the power
process by becoming a hunter, hunting not for sport or for
fulfillment but to get meat that is necessary for food. (In
young women the process is more complex, with greater
emphasis on social power; we won’t discuss that here.)
This phase having been successfully passed through, the
young man has no reluctance about settling down to the
responsibilities of raising a family. (In contrast, some mo¬
dern people indefinitely postpone having children because
they are too busy seeking some kind of “fulfillment.” We
suggest that the fulfillment they need is adequate expe¬
rience of the power process — with real goals instead
of the artificial goals of surrogate activities.) Again, ha¬
ving successfully raised his children, going through the
power process by providing them with the physical neces¬
sities, the primitive man feels that his work is done and
he is prepared to accept old age (if he survives that long)
and death. Many modern people, on the other hand, are
disturbed by the prospect of physical deterioration and
death, as is shown by the amount of effort they expend
trying to maintain their physical condition, appearance
and health. We argue that this is due to unfulfillment re¬
sulting from the fact that they have never put their physi¬
cal powers to any practical use, have never gone through
the power process using their bodies in a serious way. It
is not the primitive man, who has used his body daily for
practical purposes, who fears the deterioration of age, but
the modern man, who has never had a practical use for his
body beyond walking from his car to his house. It is the
man whose need for the power process has been satisfied
during his life who is best prepared to accept the end of


that life.

76. In response to the arguments of this section so¬
meone will say, “Society must find a way to give people
the opportunity to go through the power process.” This
won’t work for those who need autonomy in the power
process. For such people the value of the opportunity is
destroyed by the very fact that society gives it to them.
What they need is to find or make their own opportuni¬
ties. As long as the system GIVES them their opportunities
it still has them on a leash. To attain autonomy they must
get off that leash.


HOW SOME PEOPLE ADJUST

77. Not everyone in industrial-technological society suf¬
fers from psychological problems. Some people even pro¬
fess to be quite satisfied with society as it is. We now dis¬
cuss some of the reasons why people differ so greatly in
their response to modern society.

78. First, there doubtless are differences in the strength
of the drive for power. Individuals with a weak drive for
power may have relatively little need to go through the
power process, or at least relatively little need for auto¬
nomy in the power process. These are docile t5q5es who
would have been happy as plantation darkies in the Old
South. (We don’t mean to sneer at the “plantation darkies”
of the Old South. To their credit, most of the slaves were
NOT content with their servitude. We do sneer at people
who ARE content with servitude.)

79. Some people may have some exceptional drive, in
pursuing which they satisfy their need for the power pro¬
cess. For example, those who have an unusually strong
drive for social status may spend their whole lives clim¬
bing the status ladder without ever getting bored with that
game.

80. People vary in their susceptibility to advertising and
marketing techniques. Some are so susceptible that, even
if they make a great deal of money, they cannot satisfy
their constant craving for the the shiny new toys that the
marketing industry dangles before their eyes. So they al¬
ways feel hard-pressed financially even if their income is
large, and their cravings are frustrated.

81. Some people have low susceptibility to adverti¬
sing and marketing techniques. These are the people who
aren’t interested in money. Material acquisition does not
serve their need for the power process.

82. People who have medium susceptibility to adverti¬
sing and marketing techniques are able to earn enough
money to satisfy their craving for goods and services, but
only at the cost of serious effort (putting in overtime, ta¬
king a second job, earning promotions, etc.). Thus mate¬
rial acquisition serves their need for the power process.
But it does not necessarily follow that their need is fully
satisfied. They may have insufficient autonomy in the po¬
wer process (their work may consist of following orders)
and some of their drives may be frustrated (e.g., security,
aggression). (We are guilty of oversimplification in para¬
graphs 80-82 because we have assumed that the desire


9



for material acquisition is entirely a creation of the ad¬
vertising and marketing industry. Of course it’s not that
simple. [11]

83. Some people partly satisfy their need for power
by identifying themselves with a powerful organization
or mass movement. An individual lacking goals or power
joins a movement or an organization, adopts its goals as
his own, then works toward those goals. When some of
the goals are attained, the individual, even though his per¬
sonal efforts have played only an insignificant part in the
attainment of the goals, feels (through his identification
with the movement or organization) as if he had gone
through the power process. This phenomenon was exploi¬
ted by the fascists, nazis and communists. Our society uses
it too, though less crudely. Example: Manuel Noriega was
an irritant to the U.S. (goal: punish Noriega). The U.S.
invaded Panama (effort) and punished Noriega (attain¬
ment of goal). Thus the U.S. went through the power pro¬
cess and many Americans, because of their identification
with the U.S., experienced the power process vicariously.
Hence the widespread public approval of the Panama in¬
vasion; it gave people a sense of power. [15] We see the
same phenomenon in armies, corporations, political par¬
ties, humanitarian organizations, religious or ideological
movements. In particular, leftist movements tend to at¬
tract people who are seeking to satisfy their need for po¬
wer. But for most people identification with a large organi¬
zation or a mass movement does not fully satisfy the need
for power.

84. Another way in which people satisfy their need
for the power process is through surrogate activities. As
we explained in paragraphs 38-40, a surrogate activity
is an activity that is directed toward an artificial goal
that the individual pursues for the sake of the “fulfill¬
ment” that he gets from pursuing the goal, not because
he needs to attain the goal itself. For instance, there is
no practical motive for building enormous muscles, hit¬
ting a little ball into a hole or acquiring a complete se¬
ries of postage stamps. Yet many people in our society
devote themselves with passion to bodybuilding, golf or
stamp-collecting. Some people are more “other-directed”
than others, and therefore will more readily attach impor¬
tance to a surrogate activity simply because the people
around them treat it as important or because society tells
them it is important. That is why some people get very
serious about essentially trivial activities such as sports,
or bridge, or chess, or arcane scholarly pursuits, whereas
others who are more clear-sighted never see these things
as an 5 n:hing but the surrogate activities that they are, and
consequently never attach enough importance to them to
satisfy their need for the power process in that way. It only
remains to point out that in many cases a person’s way of
earning a living is also a surrogate activity. Not a PURE
surrogate activity, since part of the motive for the activity
is to gain the physical necessities and (for some people)
social status and the luxuries that advertising makes them
want. But many people put into their work far more ef¬
fort than is necessary to earn whatever money and status
they require, and this extra effort constitutes a surrogate
activity. This extra effort, together with the emotional in¬


vestment that accompanies it, is one of the most potent
forces acting toward the continual development and per¬
fecting of the system, with negative consequences for in¬
dividual freedom (see paragraph 131). Especially, for the
most creative scientists and engineers, work tends to be
largely a surrogate activity. This point is so important that
it deserves a separate discussion, which we shall give in a
moment (paragraphs 87-92).

85. In this section we have explained how many people
in modern society do satisfy their need for the power pro¬
cess to a greater or lesser extent. But we think that for
the majority of people the need for the power process is
not fully satisfied. In the first place, those who have an
insatiable drive for status, or who get firmly “hooked” on
a surrogate activity, or who identify strongly enough with
a movement or organization to satisfy their need for po¬
wer in that way, are exceptional personalities. Others are
not fully satisfied with surrogate activities or by identifi¬
cation with an organization (see paragraphs 41, 64). In
the second place, too much control is imposed by the sys¬
tem through explicit regulation or through socialization,
which results in a deficiency of autonomy, and in frustra¬
tion due to the impossibility of attaining certain goals and
the necessity of restraining too many impulses.

86. But even if most people in industrial-technological
society were well satisfied, we (FC) would still be opposed
to that form of society, because (among other reasons) we
consider it demeaning to fulfill one’s need for the power
process through surrogate activities or through identifica¬
tion with an organization, rather than through pursuit of
real goals.


THE MOTIVES OF SCIENTISTS

87. Science and technology provide the most important
examples of surrogate activities. Some scientists claim
that they are motivated by “curiosity” or by a desire to “be¬
nefit humanity.” But it is easy to see that neither of these
can be the principal motive of most scientists. As for “cu¬
riosity,” that notion is simply absurd. Most scientists work
on highly specialized problems that are not the object of
any normal curiosity. For example, is an astronomer, a ma¬
thematician or an entomologist curious about the proper¬
ties of isopropyltrimethylmethane? Of course not. Only a
chemist is curious about such a thing, and he is curious
about it only because chemistry is his surrogate activity.
Is the chemist curious about the appropriate classification
of a new species of beetle? No. That question is of interest
only to the entomologist, and he is interested in it only be¬
cause entomology is his surrogate activity. If the chemist
and the entomologist had to exert themselves seriously to
obtain the physical necessities, and if that effort exerci¬
sed their abilities in an interesting way but in some nons-
cientific pursuit, then they wouldn’t give a damn about
isopropyltrimethylmethane or the classification of beetles.
Suppose that lack of funds for postgraduate education had
led the chemist to become an insurance broker instead of
a chemist. In that case he would have been very interested


10



in insurance matters but would have cared nothing about
isopropyltrimethylmethane. In any case it is not normal to
put into the satisfaction of mere curiosity the amount of
time and effort that scientists put into their work. The “cu¬
riosity” explanation for the scientists’ motive just doesn’t
stand up.

88. The “benefit of humanity” explanation doesn’t work
any better. Some scientific work has no conceivable rela¬
tion to the welfare of the human race most of archaeo¬
logy or comparative linguistics for example. Some other
areas of science present obviously dangerous possibilities.
Yet scientists in these areas are just as enthusiastic about
their work as those who develop vaccines or study air pol¬
lution. Consider the case of Dr. Edward Teller, who had
an obvious emotional involvement in promoting nuclear
power plants. Did this involvement stem from a desire
to benefit humanity? If so, then why didn’t Dr. Teller get
emotional about other “humanitarian” causes? If he was
such a humanitarian then why did he help to develop the
H-bomb? As with many other scientific achievements, it is
very much open to question whether nuclear power plants
actually do benefit humanity. Does the cheap electricity
outweigh the accumulating waste and the risk of acci¬
dents? Dr. Teller saw only one side of the question. Clearly
his emotional involvement with nuclear power arose not
from a desire to “benefit humanity” but from a personal
fulfillment he got from his work and from seeing it put to
practical use.

89. The same is true of scientists generally. With pos¬
sible rare exceptions, their motive is neither curiosity nor
a desire to benefit humanity but the need to go through
the power process: to have a goal (a scientific problem to
solve), to make an effort (research) and to attain the goal
(solution of the problem.) Science is a surrogate activity
because scientists work mainly for the fulfillment they get
out of the work itself

90. Of course, it’s not that simple. Other motives do play
a role for many scientists. Money and status for example.
Some scientists may be persons of the type who have an
insatiable drive for status (see paragraph 79) and this may
provide much of the motivation for their work. No doubt
the majority of scientists, like the majority of the general
population, are more or less susceptible to advertising and
marketing techniques and need money to satisfy their cra¬
ving for goods and services. Thus science is not a PURE
surrogate activity. But it is in large part a surrogate acti¬
vity.

91. Also, science and technology constitute a power
mass movement, and many scientists gratify their need
for power through identification with this mass movement
(see paragraph 83).

92. Thus science marches on blindly, without regard
to the real welfare of the human race or to any other
standard, obedient only to the psychological needs of the
scientists and of the government of ficials and corporation
executives who provide the funds for research.


THE NATURE OF FREEDOM

93. We are going to argue that industrial-technological
society cannot be reformed in such a way as to prevent it
from progressively narrowing the sphere of human free¬
dom. But, because “freedom” is a word that can be inter¬
preted in many ways, we must first make clear what kind
of freedom we are concerned with.

94. By “freedom” we mean the opportunity to go
through the power process, with real goals not the artifi¬
cial goals of surrogate activities, and without interference,
manipulation or supervision from anyone, especially from
any large organization. Ereedom means being in control
(either as an individual or as a member of a SMALL group)
of the life-and-death issues of one’s existence: food, clo¬
thing, shelter and defense against whatever threats there
may be in one’s environment. Freedom means having po¬
wer; not the power to control other people but the power
to control the circumstances of one’s own life. One does
not have freedom if anyone else (especially a large organi¬
zation) has power over one, no matter how benevolently,
tolerantly and permissively that power may be exercised.
It is important not to confuse freedom with mere permis¬
siveness (see paragraph 72).

95. It is said that we live in a free society because
we have a certain number of constitutionally guaranteed
rights. But these are not as important as they seem. The
degree of personal freedom that exists in a society is de¬
termined more by the economic and technological struc¬
ture of the society than by its laws or its form of govern¬
ment. [16] Most of the Indian nations of New England
were monarchies, and many of the cities of the Italian
Renaissance were controlled by dictators. But in reading
about these societies one gets the impression that they al¬
lowed far more personal freedom than our society does.
In part this was because they lacked efficient mechanisms
for enforcing the ruler’s will: There were no modern, well-
organized police forces, no rapid long-distance communi¬
cations, no surveillance cameras, no dossiers of informa¬
tion about the lives of average citizens. Hence it was rela¬
tively easy to evade control.

96. As for our constitutional rights, consider for
example that of freedom of the press. We certainly don’t
mean to knock that right; it is very important tool for li¬
miting concentration of political power and for keeping
those who do have political power in line by publicly ex¬
posing any misbehavior on their part. But freedom of the
press is of very little use to the average citizen as an in¬
dividual. The mass media are mostly under the control
of large organizations that are integrated into the system.
Anyone who has a little money can have something prin¬
ted, or can distribute it on the Internet or in some such
way, but what he has to say will be swamped by the vast
volume of material put out by the media, hence it will
have no practical effect. To make an impression on society
with words is therefore almost impossible for most indivi¬
duals and small groups. Take us (EC) for example. If we
had never done anything violent and had submitted the
present writings to a publisher, they probably would not
have been accepted. If they had been been accepted and


11



published, they probably would not have attracted many
readers, because it’s more fun to watch the entertainment
put out by the media than to read a sober essay. Even ff
these writings had had many readers, most of these rea¬
ders would soon have forgotten what they had read as
their minds were flooded by the mass of material to which
the media expose them. In order to get our message before
the public with some chance of making a lasting impres¬
sion, we’ve had to kill people.

97. Constitutional rights are useful up to a point, but
they do not serve to guarantee much more than what
might be called the bourgeois conception of freedom. Ac¬
cording to the bourgeois conception, a “free” man is essen¬
tially an element of a social machine and has only a cer¬
tain set of prescribed and delimited freedoms; freedoms
that are designed to serve the needs of the social machine
more than those of the individual. Thus the bourgeois’s
“free” man has economic freedom because that promotes
growth and progress; he has freedom of the press because
public criticism restrains misbehavior by political leaders;
he has a right to a fair trial because imprisonment at the
whim of the powerful would be bad for the system. This
was clearly the attitude of Simon Bolivar. To him, people
deserved liberty only if they used it to promote progress
(progress as conceived by the bourgeois). Other bourgeois
thinkers have taken a similar view of freedom as a mere
means to collective ends. Chester C. Tan, “Chinese Politi¬
cal Thought in the Twentieth Century,” page 202, explains
the philosophy of the Kuomintang leader Hu Han-min:
“An individual is granted rights because he is a member
of society and his community life requires such rights. By
community Hu meant the whole society of the nation.”
And on page 259 Tan states that according to Carsum
Chang (Chang Chun-mai, head of the State Socialist Party
in China) freedom had to be used in the interest of the
state and of the people as a whole. But what kind of free¬
dom does one have if one can use it only as someone else
prescribes? EC’s conception of freedom is not that of Bo¬
livar, Hu, Chang or other bourgeois theorists. The trouble
with such theorists is that they have made the develop¬
ment and application of social theories their surrogate ac¬
tivity. Consequently the theories are designed to serve the
needs of the theorists more than the needs of any people
who may be unlucky enough to live in a society on which
the theories are imposed.

98. One more point to be made in this section: It should
not be assumed that a person has enough freedom just
because he SAYS he has enough. Ereedom is restricted in
part by psychological controls of which people are uncons¬
cious, and moreover many people’s ideas of what consti¬
tutes freedom are governed more by social convention
than by their real needs. Eor example, it’s likely that many
leftists of the oversocialized type would say that most
people, including themselves, are socialized too little ra¬
ther than too much, yet the oversocialized leftist pays a
heavy psychological price for his high level of socializa¬
tion.


SOME PRINCIPLES OF HISTORY

99. Think of history as being the sum of two compo¬
nents: an erratic component that consists of unpredictable
events that follow no discernible pattern, and a regular
component that consists of long-term historical trends.
Here we are concerned with the long-term trends.

100. EIRST PRINCIPLE. If a SMALL change is made that
affects a long-term historical trend, then the effect of that
change will almost always be transitory — the trend will
soon revert to its original state. (Example: A reform move¬
ment designed to clean up political corruption in a society
rarely has more than a short-term effect; sooner or later
the reformers relax and corruption creeps back in. The
level of political corruption in a given society tends to re¬
main constant, or to change only slowly with the evolution
of the society. Normally, a political cleanup will be perma¬
nent only if accompanied by widespread social changes; a
SMALL change in the society won’t be enough.) If a small
change in a long-term historical trend appears to be per¬
manent, it is only because the change acts in the direction
in which the trend is already moving, so that the trend is
not altered by only pushed a step ahead.

101. The first principle is almost a tautology. If a trend
were not stable with respect to small changes, it would
wander at random rather than following a definite direc¬
tion; in other words it would not be a long-term trend at
ah.

102. SECOND PRINCIPLE. If a change is made that is
sufficiently large to alter permanently a long-term histori¬
cal trend, then it will alter the society as a whole. In other
words, a society is a system in which ah parts are inter¬
related, and you can’t permanently change any important
part without changing ah other parts as well.

103. THIRD PRINCIPLE. If a change is made that is
large enough to alter permanently a long-term trend, then
the consequences for the society as a whole cannot be pre¬
dicted in advance. (Unless various other societies have
passed through the same change and have all experien¬
ced the same consequences, in which case one can pre¬
dict on empirical grounds that another society that passes
through the same change will be like to experience similar
consequences.)

104. EOURTH PRINCIPLE. A new kind of society cannot
be designed on paper. That is, you cannot plan out a new
form of society in advance, then set it up and expect it to
function as it was designed to do.

105. The third and fourth principles result from the
complexity of human societies. A change in human be¬
havior will affect the economy of a society and its physi¬
cal environment; the economy will affect the environment
and vice versa, and the changes in the economy and the
environment will affect human behavior in complex, un¬
predictable ways; and so forth. The network of causes and
effects is far too complex to be untangled and understood.

106. EIETH PRINCIPLE. People do not consciously and
rationally choose the form of their society. Societies de¬
velop through processes of social evolution that are not
under rational human control.


12



107. The fifth principle is a consequence of the other
four.

108. To illustrate: By the first principle, generally spea¬
king an attempt at social reform either acts in the direction
in which the society is developing an 3 way (so that it me¬
rely accelerates a change that would have occurred in any
case) or else it has only a transitory effect, so that the so¬
ciety soon slips back into its old groove. To make a lasting
change in the direction of development of any important
aspect of a society, reform is insufficient and revolution is
required. (A revolution does not necessarily involve an ar¬
med uprising or the overthrow of a government.) By the
second principle, a revolution never changes only one as¬
pect of a society, it changes the whole society; and by the
third principle changes occur that were never expected
or desired by the revolutionaries. By the fourth principle,
when revolutionaries or Utopians set up a new kind of so¬
ciety, it never works out as planned.

109. The American Revolution does not provide a coun¬
terexample. The American “Revolution” was not a revo¬
lution in our sense of the word, but a war of indepen¬
dence followed by a rather far-reaching political reform.
The Founding Fathers did not change the direction of de¬
velopment of American society, nor did they aspire to do
so. They only freed the development of American society
from the retarding effect of British rule. Their political
reform did not change any basic trend, but only pushed
American political culture along its natural direction of
development. British society, of which American society
was an offshoot, had been moving for a long time in the
direction of representative democracy. And prior to the
War of Independence the Americans were already prac¬
ticing a significant degree of representative democracy in
the colonial assemblies. The political system established
by the Constitution was modeled on the British system
and on the colonial assemblies. With major alteration, to
be sure — there is no doubt that the Founding Fathers took
a very important step. But it was a step along the road that
English-speaking world was already traveling. The proof
is that Britain and all of its colonies that were popula¬
ted predominantly by people of British descent ended up
with systems of representative democracy essentially si¬
milar to that of the United States. If the Founding Fathers
had lost their nerve and declined to sign the Declaration of
Independence, our way of Iffe today would not have been
significantly different. Maybe we would have had somew¬
hat closer ties to Britain, and would have had a Parliament
and Prime Minister instead of a Congress and President.
No big deal. Thus the American Revolution provides not
a counterexample to our principles but a good illustration
of them.

110. Still, one has to use common sense in applying
the principles. They are expressed in imprecise language
that allows latitude for interpretation, and exceptions to
them can be found. So we present these principles not as
inviolable laws but as rules of thumb, or guides to thin¬
king, that may provide a partial antidote to naive ideas
about the future of society. The principles should be borne
constantly in mind, and whenever one reaches a conciu-
sion that conflicts with them one should carefully reexa¬


mine one’s thinking and retain the conclusion only if one
has good, solid reasons for doing so.

INDUSTRIAL-TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY CANNOT BE
REEORMED

111. The foregoing principles help to show how hope¬
lessly difficult it would be to reform the industrial system
in such a way as to prevent it from progressively narro¬
wing our sphere of freedom. There has been a consistent
tendency, going back at least to the Industrial Revolu¬
tion for technology to strengthen the system at a high
cost in individual freedom and local autonomy. Hence
any change designed to protect freedom from technology
would be contrary to a fundamental trend in the develop¬
ment of our society. Consequently, such a change either
would be a transitory one — soon swamped by the tide
of history — or, if large enough to be permanent would
alter the nature of our whole society. This by the first
and second principles. Moreover, since society would be
altered in a way that could not be predicted in advance
(third principle) there would be great risk. Changes large
enough to make a lasting difference in favor of freedom
would not be initiated because it would be realized that
they would gravely disrupt the system. So any attempts at
reform would be too timid to be effective. Even if changes
large enough to make a lasting difference were initiated,
they would be retracted when their disruptive effects be¬
came apparent. Thus, permanent changes in favor of free¬
dom could be brought about only by persons prepared to
accept radical, dangerous and unpredictable alteration of
the entire system. In other words by revolutionaries, not
reformers.

112. People anxious to rescue freedom without sacri¬
ficing the supposed benefits of technology will suggest
naive schemes for some new form of society that would re¬
concile freedom with technology. Apart from the fact that
people who make such suggestions seldom propose any
practical means by which the new form of society could
be set up in the first place, it follows from the fourth prin¬
ciple that even if the new form of society could be once
established, it either would collapse or would give results
very different from those expected.

113. So even on very general grounds it seems highly
improbable that any way of changing society could be
found that would reconcile freedom with modern tech¬
nology. In the next few sections we will give more speci¬
fic reasons for concluding that freedom and technological
progress are incompatible.


RESTRICTION OF FREEDOM IS
UNAVOIDABLE IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

114. As explained in paragraphs 65-67, 70-73, modern
man is strapped down by a network of rules and regula¬
tions, and his fate depends on the actions of persons re¬
mote from him whose decisions he cannot influence. This
is not accidental or a result of the arbitrariness of arrogant
bureaucrats. It is necessary and inevitable in any technolo¬
gically advanced society. The system HAS TO regulate hu¬
man behavior closely in order to function. At work people


13



have to do what they are told to do, otherwise production
would be thrown into chaos. Bureaucracies HAVE TO be
run according to rigid rules. To allow any substantial per¬
sonal discretion to lower-level bureaucrats would disrupt
the system and lead to charges of unfairness due to dif¬
ferences in the way individual bureaucrats exercised their
discretion. It is true that some restrictions on our freedom
could be eliminated, but GENERALLY SPEAKING the re¬
gulation of our lives by large organizations is necessary
for the functioning of industrial-technological society. The
result is a sense of powerlessness on the part of the ave¬
rage person. It may be, however, that formal regulations
will tend increasingly to be replaced by psychological tools
that make us want to do what the system requires of us.
(Propaganda [14], educational techniques, “mental heal¬
th” programs, etc.)

115. The system HAS TO force people to behave in ways
that are increasingly remote from the natural pattern of
human behavior. Eor example, the system needs scientists,
mathematicians and engineers. It can’t function without
them. So heavy pressure is put on children to excel in
these fields. It isn’t natural for an adolescent human being
to spend the bulk of his time sitting at a desk absorbed in
study. A normal adolescent wants to spend his time in ac¬
tive contact with the real world. Among primitive peoples
the things that children are trained to do tend to be in rea¬
sonable harmony with natural human impulses. Among
the American Indians, for example, boys were trained in
active outdoor pursuits — just the sort of thing that boys
like. But in our society children are pushed into studying
technical subjects, which most do grudgingly.

116. Because of the constant pressure that the system
exerts to modify human behavior, there is a gradual in¬
crease in the number of people who cannot or will not ad¬
just to societ/s requirements: welfare leeches, youth gang
members, cultists, anti-government rebels, radical envi¬
ronmentalist saboteurs, dropouts and resisters of various
kinds.

117. In any technologically advanced society the indivi¬
dual’s fate MUST depend on decisions that he personally
cannot influence to any great extent. A technological so¬
ciety cannot be broken down into small, autonomous com¬
munities, because production depends on the cooperation
of very large numbers of people and machines. Such a
society MUST be highly organized and decisions HAVE
TO be made that affect very large numbers of people.
When a decision affects, say, a million people, then each
of the affected individuals has, on the average, only a one-
millionth share in making the decision. What usually hap¬
pens in practice is that decisions are made by public offi¬
cials or corporation executives, or by technical specialists,
but even when the public votes on a decision the number
of voters ordinarily is too large for the vote of any one
individual to be significant. [17] Thus most individuals
are unable to influence measurably the major decisions
that affect their lives. There is no conceivable way to re¬
medy this in a technologically advanced society. The sys¬
tem tries to “solve” this problem by using propaganda to
make people WANT the decisions that have been made for
them, but even if this “solution” were completely success¬


ful in making people feel better, it would be demeaning.

118. Gonservatives and some others advocate more “lo¬
cal autonomy.” Local communities once did have auto¬
nomy, but such autonomy becomes less and less pos¬
sible as local communities become more enmeshed with
and dependent on large-scale systems like public utilities,
computer networks, highway systems, the mass communi¬
cations media, the modern health care system. Also ope¬
rating against autonomy is the fact that technology ap¬
plied in one location often affects people at other locations
far way. Thus pesticide or chemical use near a creek may
contaminate the water supply hundreds of miles downs¬
tream, and the greenhouse effect affects the whole world.

119. The system does not and cannot exist to satisfy
human needs. Instead, it is human behavior that has to
be modified to fit the needs of the system. This has no¬
thing to do with the political or social ideology that may
pretend to guide the technological system. It is not the
fault of capitalism and it is not the fault of socialism. It
is the fault of technology, because the system is guided
not by ideology but by technical necessity. [18] Of course
the system does satisfy many human needs, but generally
speaking it does this only to the extend that it is to the
advantage of the system to do it. It is the needs of the sys¬
tem that are paramount, not those of the human being.
Eor example, the system provides people with food be¬
cause the system couldn’t function if everyone starved; it
attends to people’s psychological needs whenever it can
GONVENIENTLY do so, because it couldn’t function if too
many people became depressed or rebellious. But the sys¬
tem, for good, solid, practical reasons, must exert constant
pressure on people to mold their behavior to the needs
of the system. To much waste accumulating? The govern¬
ment, the media, the educational system, environmenta¬
lists, everyone inundates us with a mass of propaganda
about recycling. Need more technical personnel? A chorus
of voices exhorts kids to study science. No one stops to ask
whether it is inhumane to force adolescents to spend the
bulk of their time studying subjects most of them hate.
When skilled workers are put out of a job by technical
advances and have to undergo “retraining,” no one asks
whether it is humiliating for them to be pushed around in
this way. It is simply taken for granted that everyone must
bow to technical necessity, and for good reason: If human
needs were put before technical necessity there would be
economic problems, unemployment, shortages or worse.
The concept of “mental health” in our society is defined
largely by the extent to which an individual behaves in
accord with the needs of the system and does so without
showing signs of stress.

120. Efforts to make room for a sense of purpose and
for autonomy within the system are no better than a joke.
Eor example, one company, instead of having each of its
employees assemble only one section of a catalogue, had
each assemble a whole catalogue, and this was supposed
to give them a sense of purpose and achievement. Some
companies have tried to give their employees more auto¬
nomy in their work, but for practical reasons this usually
can be done only to a very limited extent, and in any case
employees are never given autonomy as to ultimate goals


14



— their “autonomous” efforts can never be directed to¬
ward goals that they select personally, but only toward
their employer’s goals, such as the survival and growth of
the company Any company would soon go out of business
if it permitted its employees to act otherwise. Similarly, in
any enterprise within a socialist system, workers must di¬
rect their efforts toward the goals of the enterprise, other¬
wise the enterprise will not serve its purpose as part of the
system. Once again, for purely technical reasons it is not
possible for most individuals or small groups to have much
autonomy in industrial society. Even the small-business
owner commonly has only limited autonomy. Apart from
the necessity of government regulation, he is restricted by
the fact that he must fit into the economic system and
conform to its requirements. For instance, when someone
develops a new technology, the small- business person of¬
ten has to use that technology whether he wants to or not,
in order to remain competitive.

THE ’BAD’ PARTS OF TECHNOLOGY CANNOT BE SE¬
PARATED FROM THE ’GOOD’ PARTS

121. A further reason why industrial society cannot be
reformed in favor of freedom is that modern technology
is a unified system in which all parts are dependent on
one another. You can’t get rid of the “bad” parts of techno¬
logy and retain only the “good” parts. Take modern medi¬
cine, for example. Progress in medical science depends on
progress in chemistry, physics, biology, computer science
and other fields. Advanced medical treatments require ex¬
pensive, high-tech equipment that can be made available
only by a technologically progressive, economically rich
society. Glearly you can’t have much Progress in medicine
without the whole technological system and everything
that goes with it.

122. Even if medical progress could be maintained wi¬
thout the rest of the technological system, it would by it¬
self bring certain evils. Suppose for example that a cure
for diabetes is discovered. People with a genetic tendency
to diabetes will then be able to survive and reproduce as
well as anyone else. Natural selection against genes for
diabetes will cease and such genes will spread throughout
the population. (This may be occurring to some extent al¬
ready, since diabetes, while not curable, can be controlled
through use of insulin.) The same thing will happen with
many other diseases susceptibility to which is affected by
genetic degradation of the population. The only solution
will be some sort of eugenics program or extensive gene¬
tic engineering of human beings, so that man in the fu¬
ture will no longer be a creation of nature, or of chance,
or of God (depending on your religious or philosophical
opinions), but a manufactured product.

123. If you think that big government interferes in your
life too much NOW, just wait till the government starts re¬
gulating the genetic constitution of your children. Such re¬
gulation will inevitably follow the introduction of genetic
engineering of human beings, because the consequences
of unregulated genetic engineering would be disastrous.
[19]

124. The usual response to such concerns is to talk
about “medical ethics.” But a code of ethics would not
serve to protect freedom in the face of medical progress;


it would only make matters worse. A code of ethics appli¬
cable to genetic engineering would be in effect a means of
regulating the genetic constitution of human beings. So¬
mebody (probably the upper-middle class, mostly) would
decide that such and such applications of genetic enginee¬
ring were “ethical”, and others were not, so that in effect
they would be imposing their own values on the genetic
constitution of the population at large. Even if a code of
ethics were chosen on a completely democratic basis, the
majority would be imposing their own values on any mi¬
norities who might have a different idea of what consti¬
tuted an “ethical” use of genetic engineering. The only
code of ethics that would truly protect freedom would be
one that prohibited ANY genetic engineering of human
beings, and you can be sure that no such code will ever
be applied in a technological society. No code that redu¬
ced genetic engineering to a minor role could stand up for
long, because the temptation presented by the immense
power of biotechnology would be irresistible, especially
since to the majority of people many of its applications
will seem obviously and unequivocally good (eliminating
physical and mental diseases, giving people the abilities
they need to get along in today’s world). Inevitably, gene¬
tic engineering will be used extensively, but only in ways
consistent with the needs of the industrial-technological
system. [20]


TECHNOLOGY IS A MORE POWERFUL
SOCIAL FORCE THAN THE ASPIRATION FOR
FREEDOOM

125. It is not possible to make a LASTING compromise
between technology and freedom, because technology is
by far the more powerful social force and continually en¬
croaches on freedom through REPEATED compromises.
Imagine the case of two neighbors, each of whom at the
outset owns the same amount of land, but one of whom is
more powerful than the other. The powerful one demands
a piece of the other’s land. The weak one refuses. The
powerful one says, “OK, let’s compromise. Give me half
of what I asked.” The weak one has little choice but to
give in. Some time later the powerful neighbor demands
another piece of land, again there is a compromise, and
so forth. By forcing a long series of compromises on the
weaker man, the powerful one eventually gets all of his
land. So it goes in the conflict between technology and
freedom.

126. Let us explain why technology is a more powerful
social force than the aspiration for freedom.

127. A technological advance that appears not to threa¬
ten freedom often turns out to threaten it very seriously
later on. For example, consider motorized transport. A
walking man formerly could go where he pleased, go at
his own pace without observing any traffic regulations,
and was independent of technological support-systems.
When motor vehicles were introduced they appeared to
increase man’s freedom. They took no freedom away from
the walking man, no one had to have an automobile if he


15



didn’t want one, and anyone who did choose to buy an
automobile could travel much faster and farther than a
walking man. But the introduction of motorized transport
soon changed society in such a way as to restrict greatly
man’s freedom of locomotion. When automobiles became
numerous, it became necessary to regulate their use ex¬
tensively. In a car, especially in densely populated areas,
one cannot just go where one likes at one’s own pace;
one’s movement is governed by the flow of traffic and by
various traffic laws. One is tied down by various obliga¬
tions: license requirements, driver test, renewing registra¬
tion, insurance, maintenance required for safety, monthly
payments on purchase price. Moreover, the use of moto¬
rized transport is no longer optional. Since the introduc¬
tion of motorized transport the arrangement of our cities
has changed in such a way that the majority of people
no longer live within walking distance of their place of
employment, shopping areas and recreational opportuni¬
ties, so that they HAVE TO depend on the automobile for
transportation. Or else they must use public transporta¬
tion, in which case they have even less control over their
own movement than when driving a car. Even the walker’s
freedom is now greatly restricted. In the city he conti¬
nually has to stop to wait for traffic lights that are desi¬
gned mainly to serve auto traffic. In the country, motor
traffic makes it dangerous and unpleasant to walk along
the highway. (Note this important point that we have just
illustrated with the case of motorized transport: When a
new item of technology is introduced as an option that an
individual can accept or not as he chooses, it does not ne¬
cessarily REMAIN optional. In many cases the new techno¬
logy changes society in such a way that people eventually
find themselves FORCED to use it.)

128. While technological progress AS A WHOLE conti¬
nually narrows our sphere of freedom, each new techni¬
cal advance CONSIDERED BY ITSELF appears to be de¬
sirable. Electricity, indoor plumbing, rapid long-distance
communications... how could one argue against any of
these things, or against any other of the innumerable tech¬
nical advances that have made modern society? It would
have been absurd to resist the introduction of the tele¬
phone, for example. It offered many advantages and no
disadvantages. Yet, as we explained in paragraphs 59-76,
all these technical advances taken together have created a
world in which the average man’s fate is no longer in his
own hands or in the hands of his neighbors and friends,
but in those of politicians, corporation executives and re¬
mote, anonymous technicians and bureaucrats whom he
as an individual has no power to influence. [21] The same
process will continue in the future. Take genetic enginee¬
ring, for example. Few people will resist the introduction
of a genetic technique that eliminates a hereditary disease.
It does no apparent harm and prevents.much suffering.
Yet a large number of genetic improvements taken toge¬
ther will make the human being into an engineered pro¬
duct rather than a free creation of chance (or of God, or
whatever, depending on your religious beliefs).

129. Another reason why technology is such a powerful
social force is that, within the context of a given society,
technological progress marches in only one direction; it


can never be reversed. Once a technical innovation has
been introduced, people usually become dependent on it,
so that they can never again do without it, unless it is re¬
placed by some still more advanced innovation. Not only
do people become dependent as individuals on a new item
of technology, but, even more, the system as a whole be¬
comes dependent on it. (Imagine what would happen to
the system today if computers, for example, were elimi¬
nated.) Thus the system can move in only one direction,
toward greater technologization. Technology repeatedly
forces freedom to take a step back, but technology can
never take a step back — short of the overthrow of the
whole technological system.

130. Technology advances with great rapidity and
threatens freedom at many different points at the same
time (crowding, rules and regulations, increasing depen¬
dence of individuals on large organizations, propaganda
and other psychological techniques, genetic engineering,
invasion of privacy through surveillance devices and com¬
puters, etc.). To hold back any ONE of the threats to free¬
dom would require a long and difficult social struggle.
Those who want to protect freedom are overwhelmed by
the sheer number of new attacks and the rapidity with
which they develop, hence they become apathetic and no
longer resist. To fight each of the threats separately would
be futile. Success can be hoped for only by fighting the
technological system as a whole; but that is revolution,
not reform.

131. Technicians (we use this term in its broad sense to
describe all those who perform a specialized task that re¬
quires training) tend to be so involved in their work (their
surrogate activity) that when a conflict arises between
their technical work and freedom, they almost always de¬
cide in favor of their technical work. This is obvious in
the case of scientists, but it also appears elsewhere: edu¬
cators, humanitarian groups, conservation organizations
do not hesitate to use propaganda [14] or other psycholo¬
gical techniques to help them achieve their laudable ends.
Corporations and government agencies, when they find it
useful, do not hesitate to collect information about indi¬
viduals without regard to their privacy. Law enforcement
agencies are frequently inconvenienced by the constitu¬
tional rights of suspects and often of completely innocent
persons, and they do whatever they can do legally (or so¬
metimes illegally) to restrict or circumvent those rights.
Most of these educators, government officials and law offi¬
cers believe in freedom, privacy and constitutional rights,
but when these conflict with their work, they usually feel
that their work is more important.

132. It is well known that people generally work bet¬
ter and more persistently when striving for a reward
than when attempting to avoid a punishment or negative
outcome. Scientists and other technicians are motivated
mainly by the rewards they get through their work. But
those who oppose technological invasions of freedom are
working to avoid a negative outcome, consequently there
are few who work persistently and well at this discoura¬
ging task. If reformers ever achieved a signal victory that
seemed to set up a solid barrier against further erosion of
freedom through technical progress, most would tend to


16



relax and turn their attention to more agreeable pursuits.
But the scientists would remain busy in their laboratories,
and technology as it progresses would find ways, in spite
of any barriers, to exert more and more control over in¬
dividuals and make them always more dependent on the
system.

133. No social arrangements, whether laws, institu¬
tions, customs or ethical codes, can provide permanent
protection against technology. History shows that all so¬
cial arrangements are transitory; they all change or break
down eventually. But technological advances are perma¬
nent within the context of a given civilization. Suppose
for example that it were possible to arrive at some so¬
cial arrangements that would prevent genetic engineering
from being applied to human beings, or prevent it from
being applied in such a way as to threaten freedom and di¬
gnity. Still, the technology would remain waiting. Sooner
or later the social arrangement would break down. Proba¬
bly sooner, given the pace of change in our society. Then
genetic engineering would begin to invade our sphere of
freedom, and this invasion would be irreversible (short
of a breakdown of technological civilization itself). Any
illusions about achieving anything permanent through so¬
cial arrangements should be dispelled by what is currently
happening with environmental legislation. A few years
ago its seemed that there were secure legal barriers pre¬
venting at least SOME of the worst forms of environmen¬
tal degradation. A change in the political wind, and those
barriers begin to crumble.

134. For all of the foregoing reasons, technology is a
more powerful social force than the aspiration for free¬
dom. But this statement requires an important qualifica¬
tion. It appears that during the next several decades the
industrial-technological system will be undergoing severe
stresses due to economic and environmental problems,
and especially due to problems of human behavior (alie¬
nation, rebellion, hostility, a variety of social and psy¬
chological difficulties). We hope that the stresses through
which the system is likely to pass will cause it to break
down, or at least will weaken it sufficiently so that a re¬
volution against it becomes possible. If such a revolution
occurs and is successful, then at that particular moment
the aspiration for freedom will have proved more power¬
ful than technology.

135. In paragraph 125 we used an analogy of a weak
neighbor who is left destitute by a strong neighbor who
takes all his land by forcing on him a series of compro¬
mises. But suppose now that the strong neighbor gets sick,
so tha he is unable to defend himself. The weak neigh¬
bor can force the strong one to give him his land back,
or he can kill him. If he lets the strong man survive and
only forces him to give the land back, he is a fool, because
when the strong man gets well he will again take all the
land for himself. The only sensible alternative for the wea¬
ker man is to kill the strong one while he has the chance.
In the same way, while the industrial system is sick we
must destroy it. If we compromise with it and let it reco¬
ver from its sickness, it will eventually wipe out all of our
freedom.


SIMPLER SOCIAL PROBLEMS HAVE PROVED
INTRACTABLE

136. If anyone still imagines that it would be possible
to reform the system in such a way as to protect free¬
dom from technology, let him consider how clumsily and
for the most part unsuccessfully our society has dealt
with other social problems that are far more simple and
straighfforward. Among other things, the system has fai¬
led to stop environmental degradation, political corrup¬
tion, drug trafficking or domestic abuse.

137. Take our environmental problems, for example.
Here the conflict of values is straightforward: economic
expedience now versus saving some of our natural re¬
sources for our grandchildren. [22] But on this subject we
get only a lot of blather and obfuscation from the people
who have power, and nothing like a clear, consistent
line of action, and we keep on piling up environmental
problems that our grandchildren will have to live with.
Attempts to resolve the environmental issue consist of
struggles and compromises between different factions,
some of which are ascendant at one moment, others at
another moment. The line of struggle changes with the
shifting currents of public opinion. This is not a ratio¬
nal process, nor is it one that is likely to lead to a timely
and successful solution to the problem. Major social pro¬
blems, if they get “solved” at all, are rarely or never solved
through any rational, comprehensive plan. They just work
themselves out through a process in which various compe¬
ting groups pursuing their own (usually short-term) self-
interest [23] arrive (mainly by luck) at some more or less
stable modus vivendi. In fact, the principles we formula¬
ted in paragraphs 100-106 make it seem doubtful that ra¬
tional long-term social planning can EVER be successful.

138. Thus it is clear that the human race has at best a
very limited capacity for solving even relatively straight¬
forward social problems. How then is it going to solve the
far more difficult and subtle problem of reconciling free¬
dom with technology? Technology presents clear-cut ma¬
terial advantages, whereas freedom is an abstraction that
means different things to different people, and its loss is
easily obscured by propaganda and fancy talk.

139. And note this important difference: It is concei¬
vable that our environmental problems (for example) may
some day be settled through a rational, comprehensive
plan, but if this happens it will be only because it is in
the longterm interest of the system to solve these pro¬
blems. But it is NOT in the interest of the system to pre¬
serve freedom or small-group autonomy. On the contrary,
it is in the interest of the system to bring human beha¬
vior under control to the greatest possible extent. [24]
Thus, while practical considerations may eventually force
the system to take a rational, prudent approach to envi¬
ronmental problems, equally practical considerations will
force the system to regulate human behavior ever more
closely (preferably by indirect means that will disguise
the encroachment on freedom). This isn’t just our opi¬
nion. Eminent social scientists (e.g. James Q. Wilson)
have stressed the importance of “socializing” people more
effectively.


17



REVOLUTION IS EASIER THAN REFORM

140. We hope we have convinced the reader that the
system cannot be reformed in such a way as to reconcile
freedom with technology. The only way out is to dispense
with the industrialtechnological system altogether. This
implies revolution, not necessarily an armed uprising, but
certainly a radical and fundamental change in the nature
of society.

141. People tend to assume that because a revolution
involves a much greater change than reform does, it is
more difficult to bring about than reform is. Actually, un¬
der certain circumstances revolution is much easier than
reform. The reason is that a revolutionary movement can
inspire an intensity of commitment that a reform move¬
ment cannot inspire. A reform movement merely offers
to solve a particular social problem. A revolutionary mo¬
vement offers to solve all problems at one stroke and
create a whole new world; it provides the kind of ideal
for which people will take great risks and make great sa¬
crifices. For this reasons it would be much easier to over¬
throw the whole technological system than to put effec¬
tive, permanent restraints on the development or appli¬
cation of any one segment of technology, such as gene¬
tic engineering, for example. Not many people will de¬
vote themselves with single-minded passion to imposing
and maintaining restraints on genetic engineering, but un¬
der suitable conditions large numbers of people may de¬
vote themselves passionately to a revolution against the
industrial-technological system. As we noted in paragraph
132, reformers seeking to limit certain aspects of tech¬
nology would be working to avoid a negative outcome.
But revolutionaries work to gain a powerful reward —
fulfillment of their revolutionary vision — and therefore
work harder and more persistently than reformers do.

142. Reform is always restrained by the fear of painful
consequences if changes go too far. But once a revolutio¬
nary fever has taken hold of a society, people are willing
to undergo unlimited hardships for the sake of their revo¬
lution. This was clearly shown in the French and Russian
Revolutions. It may be that in such cases only a minority
of the population is really committed to the revolution,
but this minority is sufficiently large and active so that it
becomes the dominant force in society. We will have more
to say about revolution in paragraphs 180-205.


CONTROL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

143. Since the beginning of civilization, organized so¬
cieties have had to put pressures on human beings of
the sake of the functioning of the social organism. The
kinds of pressures vary greatly from one society to ano¬
ther. Some of the pressures are physical (poor diet, exces¬
sive labor, environmental pollution), some are psycholo¬
gical (noise, crowding, forcing human behavior into the


mold that society requires). In the past, human nature
has been approximately constant, or at any rate has va¬
ried only within certain bounds. Consequently, societies
have been able to push people only up to certain limits.
When the limit of human endurance has been passed,
things start going wrong: rebellion, or crime, or corrup¬
tion, or evasion of work, or depression and other mental
problems, or an elevated death rate, or a declining birth
rate or something else, so that either the society breaks
down, or its functioning becomes too inefficient and it is
(quickly or gradually, through conquest, attrition or evo¬
lution) replaced by some more efficient form of society.

[25]

144. Thus human nature has in the past put certain li¬
mits on the development of societies. People could be pu¬
shed only so far and no farther. But today this may be
changing, because modern technology is developing ways
of modifying human beings.

145. Imagine a society that subjects people to condi¬
tions that make them terribly unhappy, then gives them
drugs to take away their unhappiness. Science fiction? It
is already happening to some extent in our own society. It
is well known that the rate of clinical depression has been
greatly increasing in recent decades. We believe that this
is due to disruption of the power process, as explained
in paragraphs 59-76. But even if we are wrong, the in¬
creasing rate of depression is certainly the result of SOME
conditions that exist in today’s society. Instead of remo¬
ving the conditions that make people depressed, modern
society gives them antidepressant drugs. In effect, antide¬
pressants are a means of modifying an individual’s inter¬
nal state in such a way as to enable him to tolerate social
conditions that he would otherwise find intolerable. (Yes,
we know that depression is often of purely genetic origin.
We are referring here to those cases in which environment
plays the predominant role.)

146. Drugs that affect the mind are only one example
of the new methods of controlling human behavior that
modern society is developing. Let us look at some of the
other methods.

147. To start with, there are the techniques of sur¬
veillance. Hidden video cameras are now used in most
stores and in many other places, computers are used to
collect and process vast amounts of information about in¬
dividuals. Information so obtained greatly increases the
effectiveness of physical coercion (i.e., law enforcement).

[26] Then there are the methods of propaganda, for which
the mass communication media provide effective vehicles.
Efficient techniques have been developed for winning
elections, selling products, influencing public opinion. The
entertainment industry serves as an important psycho¬
logical tool of the system, possibly even when it is dis¬
hing out large amounts of sex and violence. Entertain¬
ment provides modern man with an essential means of es¬
cape. While absorbed in television, videos, etc., he can for¬
get stress, anxiety, frustration, dissatisfaction. Many primi¬
tive peoples, when they don’t have work to do, are quite
content to sit for hours at a time doing nothing at all, be¬
cause they are at peace with themselves and their world.
But most modern people must be constantly occupied or


18



entertained, otherwise they get “bored,” i.e., they get fid¬
gety uneasy, irritable.

148. Other techniques strike deeper than the foregoing.
Education is no longer a simple affair of paddling a ki¬
d’s behind when he doesn’t know his lessons and patting
him on the head when he does know them. It is beco¬
ming a scientific technique for controlling the child’s deve¬
lopment. Sylvan Learning Centers, for example, have had
great success in motivating children to study, and psycho¬
logical techniques are also used with more or less success
in many conventional schools. “Parenting” techniques that
are taught to parents are designed to make children ac¬
cept fundamental values of the system and behave in ways
that the system finds desirable. “Mental health” programs,
“intervention” techniques, psychotherapy and so forth are
ostensibly designed to benefit individuals, but in practice
they usually serve as methods for inducing individuals to
think and behave as the system requires. (There is no
contradiction here; an individual whose attitudes or beha¬
vior bring him into conflict with the system is up against
a force that is too powerful for him to conquer or escape
from, hence he is likely to suffer from stress, frustration,
defeat. His path will be much easier if he thinks and be¬
haves as the system requires. In that sense the system
is acting for the benefit of the individual when it brain¬
washes him into conformity.) Child abuse in its gross and
obvious forms is disapproved in most if not all cultures.
Tormenting a child for a trivial reason or no reason at
all is something that appalls almost everyone. But many
psychologists interpret the concept of abuse much more
broadly. Is spanking, when used as part of a rational and
consistent system of discipline, a form of abuse? The ques¬
tion will ultimately be decided by whether or not spanking
tends to produce behavior that makes a person fit in well
with the existing system of society. In practice, the word
“abuse” tends to be interpreted to include any method
of child-rearing that produces behavior inconvenient for
the system. Thus, when they go beyond the prevention of
obvious, senseless cruelty, programs for preventing “child
abuse” are directed toward the control of human behavior
on behalf of the system.

149. Presumably, research will continue to increase the
effectiveness of psychological techniques for controlling
human behavior. But we think it is unlikely that psycholo¬
gical techniques alone will be sufficient to adjust human
beings to the kind of society that technology is creating.
Biological methods probably will have to be used. We have
already mentioned the use of drugs in this connection.
Neurology may provide other avenues for modifying the
human mind. Genetic engineering of human beings is al¬
ready beginning to occur in the form of “gene therapy,”
and there is no reason to assume that such methods will
not eventually be used to modify those aspects of the body
that affect mental functioning.

150. As we mentioned in paragraph 134, industrial so¬
ciety seems likely to be entering a period of severe stress,
due in part to problems of human behavior and in part
to economic and environmental problems. And a consi¬
derable proportion of the system’s economic and envi¬
ronmental problems result from the way human beings


behave. Alienation, low self-esteem, depression, hostility,
rebellion; children who won’t study, youth gangs, ille¬
gal drug use, rape, child abuse, other crimes, unsafe sex,
teen pregnancy, population growth, political corruption,
race hatred, ethnic rivalry, bitter ideological conflict (e.g.,
pro-choice vs. pro-life), political extremism, terrorism, sa¬
botage, anti-government groups, hate groups. All these
threaten the very survival of the system. The system will
therefore be FORCED to use every practical means of
controlling human behavior.

151. The social disruption that we see today is certainly
not the result of mere chance. It can only be a result of
the conditions of life that the system imposes on people.
(We have argued that the most important of these condi¬
tions is disruption of the power process.) If the systems
succeeds in imposing sufficient control over human beha¬
vior to assure its own survival, a new watershed in hu¬
man history will have been passed. Whereas formerly the
limits of human endurance have imposed limits on the
development of societies (as we explained in Paragraphs
143, 144), industrial-technological society will be able to
pass those limits by modifying human beings, whether by
psychological methods or biological methods or both. In
the future, social systems will not be adjusted to suit the
needs of human beings. Instead, human being will be ad¬
justed to suit the needs of the system. [27]

152. Generally speaking, technological control over hu¬
man behavior will probably not be introduced with a to¬
talitarian intention or even through a conscious desire
to restrict human freedom. [28] Each new step in the
assertion of control over the human mind will be ta¬
ken as a rational response to a problem that faces so¬
ciety, such as curing alcoholism, reducing the crime rate
or inducing young people to study science and enginee¬
ring. In many cases there will be a humanitarian justifica¬
tion. For example, when a psychiatrist prescribes an anti¬
depressant for a depressed patient, he is clearly doing that
individual a favor. It would be inhumane to withhold the
drug from someone who needs it. When Parents send their
children to Sylvan Learning Genters to have them manipu¬
lated into becoming enthusiastic about their studies, they
do so from concern for their children’s welfare. It may be
that some of these parents wish that one didn’t have to
have specialized training to get a job and that their kid
didn’t have to be brainwashed into becoming a computer
nerd. But what can they do? They can’t change society,
and their child may be unemployable if he doesn’t have
certain skills. So they send him to Sylvan.

153. Thus control over human behavior will be intro¬
duced not by a calculated decision of the authorities but
through a process of social evolution (RAPID evolution,
however). The process will be impossible to resist, be¬
cause each advance, considered by itself, will appear to
be beneficial, or at least the evil involved in making the
advance will appear to be beneficial, or at least the evil
involved in making the advance will seem to be less than
that which would result from not making it (see para¬
graph 127). Propaganda for example is used for many
good purposes, such as discouraging child abuse or race
hatred. [14] Sex education is obviously useful, yet the ef-


19



feet of sex education (to the extent that it is successful) is
to take the shaping of sexual attitudes away from the fa¬
mily and put it into the hands of the state as represented
by the public school system.

154. Suppose a biological trait is discovered that in¬
creases the likelihood that a child will grow up to be a cri¬
minal, and suppose some sort of gene therapy can remove
this trait. [29] Of course most parents whose children pos¬
sess the trait will have them undergo the therapy. It would
be inhumane to do otherwise, since the child would pro¬
bably have a miserable life if he grew up to be a criminal.
But many or most primitive societies have a low crime
rate in comparison with that of our society, even though
they have neither high-tech methods of child-rearing nor
harsh systems of punishment. Since there is no reason to
suppose that more modern men than primitive men have
innate predatory tendencies, the high crime rate of our
society must be due to the pressures that modern condi¬
tions put on people, to which many cannot or will not
adjust. Thus a treatment designed to remove potential cri¬
minal tendencies is at least in part a way of re-engineering
people so that they suit the requirements of the system.

155. Our society tends to regard as a “sickness” any
mode of thought or behavior that is inconvenient for the
system, and this is plausible because when an individual
doesn’t fit into the system it causes pain to the individual
as well as problems for the system. Thus the manipulation
of an individual to adjust him to the system is seen as a
“cure” for a “sickness” and therefore as good.

156. In paragraph 127 we pointed out that if the use
of a new item of technology is INITIALLY optional, it does
not necessarily REMAIN optional, because the new tech¬
nology tends to change society in such a way that it be¬
comes difficult or impossible for an individual to func¬
tion without using that technology. This applies also to the
technology of human behavior. In a world in which most
children are put through a program to make them enthu¬
siastic about studying, a parent will almost be forced to
put his kid through such a program, because if he does
not, then the kid will grow up to be, comparatively spea¬
king, an ignoramus and therefore unemployable. Or sup¬
pose a biological treatment is discovered that, without un¬
desirable side-effects, will greatly reduce the psychologi¬
cal stress from which so many people suffer in our society.
If large numbers of people choose to undergo the treat¬
ment, then the general level of stress in society will be re¬
duced, so that it will be possible for the system to increase
the stress-producing pressures. This will lead more people
to undergo the treatment; and so forth, so that eventually
the pressures may become so heavy that few people will
be able to survive without undergoing the stress-reducing
treatment. In fact, something like this seems to have hap¬
pened already with one of our society’s most important
psychological tools for enabling people to reduce (or at
least temporarily escape from) stress, namely, mass en¬
tertainment (see paragraph 147). Our use of mass enter¬
tainment is “optional”: No law requires us to watch tele¬
vision, listen to the radio, read magazines. Yet mass en¬
tertainment is a means of escape and stress-reduction on
which most of us have become dependent. Everyone com¬


plains about the trashiness of television, but almost eve¬
ryone watches it. A few have kicked the TV habit, but it
would be a rare person who could get along today without
using ANY form of mass entertainment. (Yet until quite re¬
cently in human histoy most people got along very nicely
with no other entertainment than that which each local
community created for itself) Without the entertainment
industry the system probably would not have been able to
get away with putting as much stressproducing pressure
on us as it does.

157. Assuming that industrial society survives, it is li¬
kely that technology will eventually acquire something ap¬
proaching complete control over human behavior. It has
been established beyond any rational doubt that human
thought and behavior have a largely biological basis. As
experimenters have demonstrated, feelings such as hun¬
ger, pleasure, anger and fear can be turned on and off
by electrical stimulation of appropriate parts of the brain.
Memories can be destroyed by damaging parts of the brain
or they can be brought to the surface by electrical stimu¬
lation. Hallucinations can be induced or moods changed
by drugs. There may or may not be an immaterial human
soul, but if there is one it clearly is less powerful that the
biological mechanisms of human behavior. Eor if that were
not the case then researchers would not be able so easily
to manipulate human feelings and behavior with drugs
and electrical currents.

158. It presumably would be impractical for all people
to have electrodes inserted in their heads so that they
could be controlled by the authorities. But the fact that
human thoughts and feelings are so open to biological
intervention shows that the problem of controlling hu¬
man behavior is mainly a technical problem; a problem
of neurons, hormones and complex molecules; the kind
of problem that is accessible to scientific attack. Given the
outstanding record of our society in solving technical pro¬
blems, it is overwhelmingly probable that great advances
will be made in the control of human behavior.

159. Will public resistance prevent the introduction
of technological control of human behavior? It certainly
would if an attempt were made to introduce such control
all at once. But since technological control will be intro¬
duced through a long sequence of small advances, there
will be no rational and effective public resistance. (See
paragraphs 127, 132, 153.)

160. To those who think that all this sounds like science
fiction, we point out that yesterday’s science fiction is to¬
day’s fact. The Industrial Revolution has radically altered
man’s environment and way of life, and it is only to be
expected that as technology is increasingly applied to the
human body and mind, man himself will be altered as ra¬
dically as his environment and way of life have been.


HUMAN RACE AT A CROSSROADS

161. But we have gotten ahead of our story. It is one
thing to develop in the laboratory a series of psychologi¬
cal or biological techniques for manipulating human beha¬
vior and quite another to integrate these techniques into a


20



functioning social system. The latter problem is the more
difficult of the two. For example, while the techniques of
educational psychology doubtless work quite well in the
“lab schools” where they are developed, it is not neces¬
sarily easy to apply them effectively throughout our edu¬
cational system. We all know what many of our schools
are like. The teachers are too busy taking knives and guns
away from the kids to subject them to the latest techniques
for making them into computer nerds. Thus, in spite of
all its technical advances relating to human behavior, the
system to date has not been impressively successful in
controlling human beings. The people whose behavior is
fairly well under the control of the system are those of the
type that might be called “bourgeois.” But there are gro¬
wing numbers of people who in one way or another are
rebels against the system: welfare leaches, youth gangs,
cultists, satanists, nazis, radical environmentalists, militia¬
men, etc.

162. The system is currently engaged in a desperate
struggle to overcome certain problems that threaten its
survival, among which the problems of human behavior
are the most important. If the system succeeds in acqui¬
ring sufficient control over human behavior quickly en¬
ough, it will probably survive. Otherwise it will break
down. We think the issue will most likely be resolved wi¬
thin the next several decades, say 40 to 100 years.

163. Suppose the system survives the crisis of the next
several decades. By that time it will have to have solved,
or at least brought under control, the principal problems
that confront it, in particular that of “socializing” human
beings; that is, making people sufficiently docile so that
heir behavior no longer threatens the system. That being
accomplished, it does not appear that there would be any
further obstacle to the development of technology, and it
would presumably advance toward its logical conclusion,
which is complete control over everything on Earth, in¬
cluding human beings and all other important organisms.
The system may become a unitary, monolithic organiza¬
tion, or it may be more or less fragmented and consist of a
number of organizations coexisting in a relationship that
includes elements of both cooperation and competition,
just as today the government, the corporations and other
large organizations both cooperate and compete with one
another. Human freedom mostly will have vanished, be¬
cause individuals and small groups will be impotent vis-
a-vis large organizations armed with supertechnology and
an arsenal of advanced psychological and biological tools
for manipulating human beings, besides instruments of
surveillance and physical coercion. Only a small number
of people will have any real power, and even these proba¬
bly will have only very limited freedom, because their be¬
havior too will be regulated; just as today our politicians
and corporation executives can retain their positions of
power only as long as their behavior remains within cer¬
tain fairly narrow limits.

164. Don’t imagine that the systems will stop develo¬
ping further techniques for controlling human beings and
nature once the crisis of the next few decades is over and
increasing control is no longer necessary for the system’s
survival. On the contrary, once the hard times are over


the system will increase its control over people and nature
more rapidly, because it will no longer be hampered by dif¬
ficulties of the kind that it is currently experiencing. Survi¬
val is not the principal motive for extending control. As we
explained in paragraphs 87-90, technicians and scientists
carry on their work largely as a surrogate activity; that is,
they satisfy their need for power by solving technical pro¬
blems. They will continue to do this with unabated enthu¬
siasm, and among the most interesting and challenging
problems for them to solve will be those of understanding
the human body and mind and intervening in their deve¬
lopment. For the “good of humanity,” of course.

165. But suppose on the other hand that the stresses of
the coming decades prove to be too much for the system. If
the system breaks down there may be a period of chaos, a
“time of troubles” such as those that history has recorded
at various epochs in the past. It is impossible to predict
what would emerge from such a time of troubles, but at
any rate the human race would be given a new chance.
The greatest danger is that industrial society may begin
to reconstitute itself within the first few years after the
breakdown. Certainly there will be many people (power-
hungry t5q3es espeeially) who will be anxious to get the
factories running again.

166. Therefore two tasks confront those who hate the
servitude to which the industrial system is reducing the
human race. First, we must work to heighten the social
stresses within the system so as to increase the likelihood
that it will break down or be weakened sufficiently so
that a revolution against it becomes possible. Second, it is
necessary to develop and propagate an ideology that op¬
poses technology and the industrial system. Such an ideo¬
logy can become the basis for a revolution against indus¬
trial society if and when the system becomes sufficiently
weakened. And such an ideology will help to assure that,
if and when industrial society breaks down, its remnants
will be smashed beyond repair, so that the system cannot
be reconstituted. The factories should be destroyed, tech¬
nical books burned, etc.


HUMAN SUFFERING

167. The industrial system will not break down purely
as a result of revolutionary action. It will not be vulne¬
rable to revolutionary attack unless its own internal pro¬
blems of development lead it into very serious difficulties.
So if the system breaks down it will do so either sponta¬
neously, or through a process that is in part spontaneous
but helped along by revolutionaries. If the breakdown is
sudden, many people will die, since the world’s popula¬
tion has become so overblown that it cannot even feed
itself any longer without advanced technology. Even if the
breakdown is gradual enough so that reduction of the po¬
pulation can occur more through lowering of the birth rate
than through elevation of the death rate, the process of de¬
industrialization probably will be very chaotic and involve
much suffering. It is naive to think it likely that technology
can be phased out in a smoothly managed, orderly way.


21



especially since the technophiles will fight stubbornly at
every step. Is it therefore cruel to work for the breakdown
of the system? Maybe, but maybe not. In the first place,
revolutionaries will not be able to break the system down
unless it is already in enough trouble so that there would
be a good chance of its eventually breaking down by itself
anyway; and the bigger the system grows, the more di¬
sastrous the consequences of its breakdown will be; so it
may be that revolutionaries, by hastening the onset of the
breakdown, will be reducing the extent of the disaster.

168. In the second place, one has to balance struggle
and death against the loss of freedom and dignity. To
many of us, freedom and dignity are more important than
a long life or avoidance of physical pain. Besides, we all
have to die some time, and it may be better to die fighting
for survival, or for a cause, than to live a long but empty
and purposeless life.

169. In the third place, it is not at all certain that sur¬
vival of the system will lead to less suffering than break¬
down of the system would. The system has already cau¬
sed, and is continuing to cause, immense suffering all
over the world. Ancient cultures, that for hundreds of
years gave people a satisfactory relationship with each
other and with their environment, have been shattered
by contact with industrial society, and the result has been
a whole catalogue of economic, environmental, social and
psychological problems. One of the effects of the intrusion
of industrial society has been that over much of the world
traditional controls on population have been thrown out
of balance. Hence the population explosion, with all that
that implies. Then there is the psychological suffering that
is widespread throughout the supposedly fortunate coun¬
tries of the West (see paragraphs 44, 45). No one knows
what will happen as a result of ozone depletion, the green¬
house effect and other environmental problems that can¬
not yet be foreseen. And, as nuclear proliferation has
shown, new technology cannot be kept out of the hands
of dictators and irresponsible Third World nations. Would
you like to speculate about what Iraq or North Korea will
do with genetic engineering?

170. “Oh!” say the technophiles, “Science is going to
fix all that! We will conquer famine, eliminate psychologi¬
cal suffering, make everybody healthy and happy!” Yeah,
sure. That’s what they said 200 years ago. The Indus¬
trial Revolution was supposed to eliminate poverty, make
everybody happy, etc. The actual result has been quite
different. The technophiles are hopelessly naive (or self-
deceiving) in their understanding of social problems. They
are unaware of (or choose to ignore) the fact that when
large changes, even seemingly beneficial ones, are intro¬
duced into a society, they lead to a long sequence of other
changes, most of which are impossible to predict (para¬
graph 103). The result is disruption of the society. So it
is very probable that in their attempts to end poverty and
disease, engineer docile, happy personalities and so forth,
the technophiles will create social systems that are ter¬
ribly troubled, even more so than the present one. For
example, the scientists boast that they will end famine
by creating new, genetically engineered food plants. But
this will allow the human population to keep expanding


indefinitely, and it is well known that crowding leads to in¬
creased stress and aggression. This is merely one example
of the PREDICTABLE problems that will arise. We empha¬
size that, as past experience has shown, technical progress
will lead to other new problems that CANNOT be predic¬
ted in advance (paragraph 103). In fact, ever since the
Industrial Revolution, technology has been creating new
problems for society far more rapidly than it has been sol¬
ving old ones. Thus it will take a long and difficult period
of trial and error for the technophiles to work the bugs out
of their Brave New World (if they every do). In the mean¬
time there will be great suffering. So it is not at all clear
that the survival of industrial society would involve less
suffering than the breakdown of that society would. Tech¬
nology has gotten the human race into a fix from which
there is not likely to be any easy escape.


THE FUTURE

171. But suppose now that industrial society does sur¬
vive the next several decades and that the bugs do even¬
tually get worked out of the system, so that it functions
smoothly. What kind of system will it be? We will consider
several possibilities.

172. Eirst let us postulate that the computer scientists
succeed in developing intelligent machines that can do all
things better than human beings can do them. In that case
presumably all work will be done by vast, highly orga¬
nized systems of machines and no human effort will be
necessary. Either of two cases might occur. The machines
might be permitted to make all of their own decisions wi¬
thout human oversight, or else human control over the
machines might be retained.

173. If the machines are permitted to make all their
own decisions, we can’t make any conjectures as to the
results, because it is impossible to guess how such ma¬
chines might behave. We only point out that the fate of
the human race would be at the mercy of the machines.
It might be argued that the human race would never be
foolish enough to hand over all power to the machines.
But we are suggesting neither that the human race would
voluntarily turn power over to the machines nor that the
machines would willfully seize power. What we do sug¬
gest is that the human race might easily permit itself to
drift into a position of such dependence on the machines
that it would have no practical choice but to accept all of
the machines’ decisions. As society and the problems that
face it become more and more complex and as machines
become more and more intelligent, people will let ma¬
chines make more and more of their decisions for them,
simply because machine-made decisions will bring better
results than man-made ones. Eventually a stage may be
reached at which the decisions necessary to keep the sys¬
tem running will be so complex that human beings will be
incapable of making them intelligently. At that stage the
machines will be in effective control. People won’t be able
to just turn the machine off, because they will be so de¬
pendent on them that turning them off would amount to
suicide.


22



174. On the other hand it is possible that human control
over the machines may be retained. In that case the ave¬
rage man may have control over certain private machines
of his own, such as his car or his personal computer,
but control over large systems of machines will be in the
hands of a tiny elite — just as it is today, but with two dif¬
ferences. Due to improved techniques the elite will have
greater control over the masses; and because human work
will no longer be necessary the masses will be superfluous,
a useless burden on the system. If the elite is ruthless
they may simply decide to exterminate the mass of hu¬
manity. If they are humane they may use propaganda or
other psychological or biological techniques to reduce the
birth rate until the mass of humanity becomes extinct, lea¬
ving the world to the elite. Or, if the elite consists of soft¬
hearted liberals, they may decide to play the role of good
shepherds to the rest of the human race. They will see
to it that everyone’s physical needs are satisfied, that all
children are raised under psychologically hygienic condi¬
tions, that everyone has a wholesome hobby to keep him
busy, and that anyone who may become dissatisfied un¬
dergoes “treatment” to cure his “problem.” Of course, life
will be so purposeless that people will have to be biologi¬
cally or psychologically engineered either to remove their
need for the power process or to make them “sublimate”
their drive for power into some harmless hobby. These en¬
gineered human beings may be happy in such a society,
but they most certainly will not be free. They will have
been reduced to the status of domestic animals.

175. But suppose now that the computer scientists do
not succeed in developing artificial intelligence, so that
human work remains necessary. Even so, machines will
take care of more and more of the simpler tasks so that
there will be an increasing surplus of human workers at
the lower levels of ability. (We see this happening already.
There are many people who find it difficult or impos¬
sible to get work, because for intellectual or psychologi¬
cal reasons they cannot acquire the level of training ne¬
cessary to make themselves useful in the present system.)
On those who are employed, ever-increasing demands will
be placed: They will need more and more training, more
and more ability, and will have to be ever more reliable,
conforming and docile, because they will be more and
more like cells of a giant organism. Their tasks will be
increasingly specialized, so that their work will be, in a
sense, out of touch with the real world, being concentra¬
ted on one tiny slice of reality. The system will have to use
any means that it can, whether psychological or biological,
to engineer people to be docile, to have the abilities that
the system requires and to “sublimate” their drive for po¬
wer into some specialized task. But the statement that the
people of such a society will have to be docile may require
qualification. The society may find competitiveness useful,
provided that ways are found of directing competitiveness
into channels that serve the needs of the system. We can
imagine a future society in which there is endless competi¬
tion for positions of prestige and power. But no more than
a very few people will ever reach the top, where the only
real power is (see end of paragraph 163). Very repellent is
a society in which a person can satisfy his need for power


only by pushing large numbers of other people out of the
way and depriving them of THEIR opportunity for power.

176. One can envision scenarios that incorporate as¬
pects of more than one of the possibilities that we have
just discussed. For instance, it may be that machines will
take over most of the work that is of real, practical impor¬
tance, but that human beings will be kept busy by being
given relatively unimportant work. It has been sugges¬
ted, for example, that a great development of the service
industries might provide work for human beings. Thus
people would spent their time shining each other’s shoes,
driving each other around in taxicabs, making handicrafts
for one another, waiting on each other’s tables, etc. This
seems to us a thoroughly contemptible way for the human
race to end up, and we doubt that many people would find
fulfilling lives in such pointless busy-work. They would
seek other, dangerous outlets (drugs, crime, “cults,” hate
groups) unless they were biologically or psychologically
engineered to adapt them to such a way of life.

177. Needless to say, the scenarios outlined above do
not exhaust all the possibilities. They only indicate the
kinds of outcomes that seem to us most likely. But we can
envision no plausible scenarios that are any more pala¬
table than the ones we’ve just described. It is overwhel¬
mingly probable that if the industrial-technological system
survives the next 40 to 100 years, it will by that time have
developed certain general characteristics: Individuals (at
least those of the “bourgeois” type, who are integrated
into the system and make it run, and who therefore have
all the power) will be more dependent than ever on large
organizations; they will be more “socialized” than ever
and their physical and mental qualities to a significant
extent (possibly to a very great extent) will be those that
are engineered into them rather than being the results of
chance (or of God’s will, or whatever); and whatever may
be left of wild nature will be reduced to remnants preser¬
ved for scientific study and kept under the supervision and
management of scientists (hence it will no longer be truly
wild). In the long run (say a few centuries from now) it
is likely that neither the human race nor any other impor¬
tant organisms will exist as we know them today, because
once you start modifying organisms through genetic engi¬
neering there is no reason to stop at any particular point,
so that the modifications will probably continue until man
and other organisms have been utterly transformed.

178. Whatever else may be the case, it is certain that
technology is creating for human beings a new physical
and social environment radically different from the spec¬
trum of environments to which natural selection has adap¬
ted the human race physically and psychologically. If man
is not adjusted to this new environment by being artifi¬
cially re-engineered, then he will be adapted to it through
a long and painful process of natural selection. The former
is far more likely than the latter.

179. It would be better to dump the whole stinking sys¬
tem and take the consequences.


23



STRATEGY

180. The technophiles are taking us all on an utterly
reckless ride into the unknown. Many people understand
something of what technological progress is doing to us
yet take a passive attitude toward it because they think
it is inevitable. But we (FC) don’t think it is inevitable.
We think it can be stopped, and we will give here some
indications of how to go about stopping it.

181. As we stated in paragraph 166, the two main tasks
for the present are to promote social stress and instabi¬
lity in industrial society and to develop and propagate an
ideology that opposes technology and the industrial sys¬
tem. When the system becomes sufficiently stressed and
unstable, a revolution against technology may be possible.
The pattern would be similar to that of the French and
Russian Revolutions. French society and Russian society,
for several decades prior to their respective revolutions,
showed increasing signs of stress and weakness. Meanw¬
hile, ideologies were being developed that offered a new
world view that was quite different from the old one. In
the Russian case, revolutionaries were actively working to
undermine the old order. Then, when the old system was
put under sufficient additional stress (by financial crisis in
France, by military defeat in Russia) it was swept away by
revolution. What we propose is something along the same
lines.

182. It will be objected that the French and Russian Re¬
volutions were failures. But most revolutions have two
goals. One is to destroy an old form of society and the
other is to set up the new form of society envisioned by
the revolutionaries. The French and Russian revolutiona¬
ries failed (fortunately!) to create the new kind of society
of which they dreamed, but they were quite successful in
destroying the old society. We have no illusions about the
feasibility of creating a new, ideal form of society. Our goal
is only to destroy the existing form of society.

183. But an ideology, in order to gain enthusiastic sup¬
port, must have a positive ideal as well as a negative one;
it must be FOR something as well as AGAINST some¬
thing. The positive ideal that we propose is Nature. That
is, WILD nature: those aspects of the functioning of the
Earth and its living things that are independent of human
management and free of human interference and control.
And with wild nature we include human nature, by which
we mean those aspects of the functioning of the human
individual that are not subject to regulation by organized
society but are products of chance, or free will, or God
(depending on your religious or philosophical opinions).

184. Nature makes a perfect counter-ideal to techno¬
logy for several reasons. Nature (that which is outside the
power of the system) is the opposite of technology (which
seeks to expand indefinitely the power of the system).
Most people will agree that nature is beautiful; certainly it
has tremendous popular appeal. The radical environmen¬
talists ALREADY hold an ideology that exalts nature and
opposes technology. [30] It is not necessary for the sake
of nature to set up some chimerical utopia or any new
kind of social order. Nature takes care of itself: It was a
spontaneous creation that existed long before any human


society, and for countless centuries many different kinds
of human societies coexisted with nature without doing
it an excessive amount of damage. Only with the Indus¬
trial Revolution did the effect of human society on nature
become really devastating. To relieve the pressure on na¬
ture it is not necessary to create a special kind of social
system, it is only necessary to get rid of industrial society.
Granted, this will not solve all problems. Industrial society
has already done tremendous damage to nature and it
will take a very long time for the scars to heal. Besides,
even preindustrial societies can do significant damage to
nature. Nevertheless, getting rid of industrial society will
accomplish a great deal. It will relieve the worst of the
pressure on nature so that the scars can begin to heal.
It will remove the capacity of organized society to keep
increasing its control over nature (including human na¬
ture) . Whatever kind of society may exist after the demise
of the industrial system, it is certain that most people will
live close to nature, because in the absence of advanced
technology there is no other way that people GAN live.
To feed themselves they must be peasants or herdsmen or
fishermen or hunters, etc. And, generally speaking, local
autonomy should tend to increase, because lack of advan¬
ced technology and rapid communications will limit the
capacity of governments or other large organizations to
control local communities.

185. As for the negative consequences of eliminating
industrial society — well, you can’t eat your cake and have
it too. To gain one thing you have to sacrifice another.

186. Most people hate psychological conflict. For this
reason they avoid doing any serious thinking about diffi¬
cult social issues, and they like to have such issues pre¬
sented to them in simple, black-and-white terms: THIS is
all good and THAT is all bad. The revolutionary ideology
should therefore be developed on two levels.

187. On the more sophisticated level the ideology
should address itself to people who are intelligent,
thoughtful and rational. The object should be to create
a core of people who will be opposed to the industrial
system on a rational, thought-out basis, with full appre¬
ciation of the problems and ambiguities involved, and of
the price that has to be paid for getting rid of the system.
It is particularly important to attract people of this type,
as they are capable people and will be instrumental in
influencing others. These people should be addressed on
as rational a level as possible. Facts should never inten¬
tionally be distorted and intemperate language should be
avoided. This does not mean that no appeal can be made
to the emotions, but in making such appeal care should
be taken to avoid misrepresenting the truth or doing any¬
thing else that would destroy the intellectual respectabi¬
lity of the ideology.

188. On a second level, the ideology should be propa¬
gated in a simplified form that will enable the unthin¬
king majority to see the conflict of technology vs. nature
in unambiguous terms. But even on this second level the
ideology should not be expressed in language that is so
cheap, intemperate or irrational that it alienates people of
the thoughfful and rational type. Cheap, intemperate pro¬
paganda sometimes achieves impressive short-term gains.


24



but it will be more advantageous in the long run to keep
the loyalty of a small number of intelligently committed
people than to arouse the passions of an unthinking, fi¬
ckle mob who will change their attitude as soon as so¬
meone comes along with a better propaganda gimmick.
However, propaganda of the rabble-rousing type may be
necessary when the system is nearing the point of collapse
and there is a final struggle between rival ideologies to de¬
termine which will become dominant when the old world¬
view goes under.

189. Prior to that final struggle, the revolutionaries
should not expect to have a majority of people on their
side. History is made by active, determined minorities, not
by the majority, which seldom has a clear and consistent
idea of what it really wants. Until the time comes for the
final push toward revolution [31], the task of revolutiona¬
ries will be less to win the shallow support of the majority
than to huild a small core of deeply committed people. As
for the majority, it will be enough to make them aware of
the existence of the new ideology and remind them of it
frequently; though of course it will be desirable to get ma¬
jority support to the extent that this can be done without
weakening the core of seriously committed people.

190. Any kind of social conflict helps to destabi¬
lize the system, hut one should be careful about what
kind of conflict one encourages. The line of conflict
should be drawn between the mass of the people and
the power-holding elite of industrial society (politicians,
scientists, upper-level business executives, government of¬
ficials, etc.). It should NOT be drawn between the revo¬
lutionaries and the mass of the people. For example, it
would he had strategy for the revolutionaries to condemn
Americans for their hahits of consumption. Instead, the
average American should be portrayed as a victim of the
advertising and marketing industry, which has suckered
him into buying a lot of junk that he doesn’t need and
that is very poor compensation for his lost freedom. Ei¬
ther approach is consistent with the facts. It is merely a
matter of attitude whether you hlame the advertising in¬
dustry for manipulating the public or blame the public for
allowing itself to be manipulated. As a matter of strategy
one should generally avoid blaming the public.

191. One should think twice before encouraging any
other social conflict than that between the power-holding
elite (which wields technology) and the general public
(over which technology exerts its power). For one thing,
other conflicts tend to distract attention from the impor¬
tant conflicts (between power-elite and ordinary people,
between technology and nature); for another thing, other
conflicts may actually tend to encourage technologization,
because each side in such a conflict wants to use techno¬
logical power to gain advantages over its adversary. This
is clearly seen in rivalries between nations. It also appears
in ethnic conflicts within nations. For example, in America
many black leaders are anxious to gain power for African
Americans by placing back individuals in the technologi¬
cal power-elite. They want there to be many black go¬
vernment officials, scientists, corporation executives and
so forth. In this way they are helping to absorb the Afri¬
can American subculture into the technological system.


Generally speaking, one should encourage only those so¬
cial conflicts that can be fitted into the framework of the
conflicts of power-elite vs. ordinary people, technology vs
nature.

192. But the way to discourage ethnic conflict is NOT
through militant advocacy of minority rights (see para¬
graphs 21, 29). Instead, the revolutionaries should em¬
phasize that although minorities do suffer more or less
disadvantage, this disadvantage is of peripheral signifi¬
cance. Our real enemy is the industrial- technological sys¬
tem, and in the struggle against the system, ethnic distinc¬
tions are of no importance.

193. The kind of revolution we have in mind will not
necessarily involve an armed uprising against any govern¬
ment. It may or may not involve physical violence, but it
will not be a POLITICAL revolution. Its focus will be on
technology and economics, not politics. [32]

194. Probably the revolutionaries should even AVOID
assuming political power, whether by legal or illegal
means, until the industrial system is stressed to the dan¬
ger point and has proved itself to be a failure in the eyes
of most people. Suppose for example that some “green”
party should win control of the United States Congress
in an election. In order to avoid betra 3 dng or watering
down their own ideology they would have to take vigrous
measures to turn economic growth into economic shrin¬
kage. To the average man the results would appear di¬
sastrous: There would be massive unemployment, shor¬
tages of commodities, etc. Even if the grosser ill effects
could be avoided through superhumanly skillful manage¬
ment, still people would have to begin giving up the luxu¬
ries to which they have become addicted. Dissatisfaction
would grow, the “green” party would be voted out o,f off-
fice and the revolutionaries would have suffered a severe
setback. For this reason the revolutionaries should not try
to acquire political power until the system has gotten it¬
self into such a mess that any hardships will be seen as
resulting from the failures of the industrial system itself
and not from the policies of the revolutionaries. The revo¬
lution against technology will probably have to be a revo¬
lution by outsiders, a revolution from below and not from
above.

195. The revolution must be international and world¬
wide. It cannot be carried out on a nation-by-nation ba¬
sis. Whenever it is suggested that the United States, for
example, should cut back on technological progress or
economic growth, people get hysterical and start screa¬
ming that if we fall behind in technology the Japanese
will get ahead of us. Holy robots! The world will fly off its
orbit if the Japanese ever sell more cars than we do! (Na¬
tionalism is a great promoter of technology.) More rea¬
sonably, it is argued that if the relatively democratic na¬
tions of the world fall behind in technology while nasty,
dictatorial nations like China, Vietnam and North Korea
continue to progress, eventually the dictators may come
to dominate the world. That is why the industrial system
should be attacked in all nations simultaneously, to the
extent that this may be possible. True, there is no assu¬
rance that the industrial system can be destroyed at ap¬
proximately the same time all over the world, and it is


25



even conceivable that the attempt to overthrow the sys¬
tem could lead instead to the domination of the system
by dictators. That is a risk that has to be taken. And it is
worth taking, since the difference between a “democra¬
tic” industrial system and one controlled by dictators is
small compared with the difference between an industrial
system and a non-industrial one. [33] It might even be
argued that an industrial system controlled by dictators
would be preferable, because dictator-controlled systems
usually have proved ineffficient, hence they are presuma¬
bly more likely to break down. Look at Cuba.

196. Revolutionaries might consider favoring measures
that tend to bind the world economy into a unified whole.
Free trade agreements like NAFTA and GATT are probably
harmful to the environment in the short run, but in the
long run they may perhaps be advantageous because they
foster economic interdependence between nations. It will
be easier to destroy the industrial system on a worldwide
basis if the world economy is so unified that its breakdown
in any one major nation will lead to its breakdown in all
industrialized nations.

197. Some people take the line that modern man has
too much power, too much control over nature; they argue
for a more passive attitude on the part of the human
race. At best these people are expressing themselves un-
clearly because they fail to distinguish between power
for LARGE ORGANIZATIONS and power for INDIVIDUALS
and SMALL GROUPS. It is a mistake to argue for power¬
lessness and passivity, because people NEED power. Mo¬
dern man as a collective entity — that is, the industrial
system — has immense power over nature, and we (EG)
regard this as evil. But modern INDIVIDUALS and SMALL
GROUPS OP INDIVIDUALS have far less power than pri¬
mitive man ever did. Generally speaking, the vast power
of “modern man” over nature is exercised not by indivi¬
duals or small groups but by large organizations. To the
extent that the average modern INDIVIDUAL can wield
the power of technology, he is permitted to do so only
within narrow limits and only under the supervision and
control of the system. (You need a license for everything
and with the license come rules and regulations.) The in¬
dividual has only those technological powers with which
the system chooses to provide him. His PERSONAL power
over nature is slight.

198. Primitive INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS ac¬
tually had considerable power over nature; or maybe it
would be better to say power WITHIN nature. When pri¬
mitive man needed food he knew how to find and prepare
edible roots, how to track game and take it with home¬
made weapons. He knew how to protect himself from heat
cold, rain, dangerous animals, etc. But primitive man did
relatively little damage to nature because the COLLEG-
TIVE power of primitive society was negligible compared
to the COLLECTIVE power of industrial society.

199. Instead of arguing for powerlessness and passi¬
vity, one should argue that the power of the INDUSTRIAL
SYSTEM should be broken, and that this will greatly IN¬
CREASE the power and freedom of INDIVIDUALS and
SMALL GROUPS.

200. Until the industrial system has been thoroughly


wrecked, the destruction of that system must be the re¬
volutionaries’ ONLY goal. Other goals would distract at¬
tention and energy from the main goal. More importantly
if the revolutionaries permit themselves to have any other
goal than the destruction of technology, they will be temp¬
ted to use technology as a tool for reaching that other
goal. If they give in to that temptation, they will fall right
back into the technological trap, because modern techno¬
logy is a unified, tightly organized system, so that, in or¬
der to retain SOME technology, one finds oneself obliged
to retain MOST technology, hence one ends up sacrificing
only token amounts of technology.

201. Suppose for example that the revolutionaries took
“social justice” as a goal. Human nature being what it
is, social justice would not come about spontaneously;
it would have to be enforced. In order to enforce it the
revolutionaries would have to retain central organization
and control. For that they would need rapid long-distance
transportation and communication, and therefore all the
technology needed to support the transportation and com¬
munication systems. To feed and clothe poor people they
would have to use agricultural and manufacturing tech¬
nology. And so forth. So that the attempt to insure social
justice would force them to retain most parts of the tech¬
nological system. Not that we have anything against social
justice, but it must not be allowed to interfere with the ef¬
fort to get rid of the technological system.

202. It would be hopeless for revolutionaries to try to at¬
tack the system without using SOME modern technology.
If nothing else they must use the communications media
to spread their message. But they should use modern tech¬
nology for only ONE purpose: to attack the technological
system.

203. Imagine an alcoholic sitting with a barrel of wine
in front of him. Suppose he starts sa 3 dng to himself, “Wine
isn’t bad for you if used in moderation. Why, they say
small amounts of wine are even good for you! It won’t
do me any harm if I take just one little drink....” Well you
know what is going to happen. Never forget that the hu¬
man race with technology is just like an alcoholic with a
barrel of wine.

204. Revolutionaries should have as many children as
they can. There is strong scientific evidence that social at¬
titudes are to a significant extent inherited. No one sug¬
gests that a social attitude is a direct outcome of a per¬
son’s genetic constitution, but it appears that persona¬
lity traits are partly inherited and that certain persona¬
lity traits tend, within the context of our society, to make
a person more likely to hold this or that social attitude.
Objections to these findings have been raised, but the ob¬
jections are feeble and seem to be ideologically motiva¬
ted. In any event, no one denies that children tend on the
average to hold social attitudes similar to those of their
parents. Erom our point of view it doesn’t matter all that
much whether the attitudes are passed on genetically or
through childhood training. In either case they ARE pas¬
sed on.

205. The trouble is that many of the people who are
inclined to rebel against the industrial system are also
concerned about the population problems, hence they are


26



apt to have few or no children. In this way they may be
handing the world over to the sort of people who sup¬
port or at least accept the industrial system. To ensure
the strength of the next generation of revolutionaries the
present generation should reproduce itself abundantly. In
doing so they will be worsening the population problem
only slightly. And the important problem is to get rid of
the industrial system, because once the industrial system
is gone the world’s population necessarily will decrease
(see paragraph 167); whereas, if the industrial system
survives, it will continue developing new techniques of
food production that may enable the world’s population
to keep increasing almost indefinitely.

206. With regard to revolutionary strategy, the only
points on which we absolutely insist are that the single
overriding goal must be the elimination of modern tech¬
nology, and that no other goal can be allowed to compete
with this one. For the rest, revolutionaries should take an
empirical approach. If experience indicates that some of
the recommendations made in the foregoing paragraphs
are not going to give good results, then those recommen¬
dations should be discarded.


TWO KINDS OF TECHNOLOGY

207. An argument likely to be raised against our pro¬
posed revolution is that it is bound to fail, because (it is
claimed) throughout history technology has always pro¬
gressed, never regressed, hence technological regression
is impossible. But this claim is false.

208. We distinguish between two kinds of technology,
which we will call smallscale technology and organiza-
tiondependent technology. Small-scale technology is tech¬
nology that can be used by small-scale communities wi¬
thout outside assistance. Organization-dependent tech¬
nology is technology that depends on large-scale social
organization. We are aware of no significant cases of
regression in small-scale technology. But organization-
dependent technology DOES regress when the social or¬
ganization on which it depends breaks down. Example:
When the Roman Empire fell apart the Romans’ small-
scale technology survived because any clever village
craftsman could build, for instance, a water wheel, any
skilled smith could make steel by Roman methods, and so
forth. But the Romans’ organization- dependent techno¬
logy DID regress. Their aqueducts fell into disrepair and
were never rebuilt. Their techniques of road construction
were lost. The Roman system of urban sanitation was for¬
gotten, so that not until rather recent times did the sani¬
tation of European cities equal that of Ancient Rome.

209. The reason why technology has seemed always to
progress is that, until perhaps a century or two before the
Industrial Revolution, most technology was small-scale
technology. But most of the technology developed since
the Industrial Revolution is organization-dependent tech¬
nology. Take the refrigerator for example. Without factory-
made parts or the facilities of a postindustrial machine
shop it would be virtually impossible for a handful of local


craftsmen to build a refrigerator. If by some miracle they
did succeed in building one it would be useless to them
without a reliable source of electric power. So they would
have to dam a stream and build a generator. Generators
require large amounts of copper wire. Imagine trying to
make that wire without modern machinery. And where
would they get a gas suitable for refrigeration? It would
be much easier to build an icehouse or preserve food by
drying or picking, as was done before the invention of the
refrigerator.

210. So it is clear that if the industrial system were once
thoroughly broken down, refrigeration technology would
quickly be lost. The same is true of other organization-
dependent technology. And once this technology had been
lost for a generation or so it would take centuries to re¬
build it, just as it took centuries to build it the first time
around. Surviving technical books would be few and scat¬
tered. An industrial society, if built from scratch without
outside help, can only be built in a series of stages: You
need tools to make tools to make tools to make tools...
A long process of economic development and progress in
social organization is required. And, even in the absence
of an ideology opposed to technology, there is no reason
to believe that anyone would be interested in rebuilding
industrial society. The enthusiasm for “progress” is a phe¬
nomenon peculiar to the modern form of society, and it
seems not to have existed prior to the 17th century or the¬
reabouts.

211. In the late Middle Ages there were four main ci¬
vilizations that were about equally “advanced”: Europe,
the Islamic world, India, and the Far East (China, Japan,
Korea). Three of those civilizations remained more or less
stable, and only Europe became d 3 mamic. No one knows
why Europe became d 3 mamic at that time; historians have
their theories but these are only speculation. At any rate,
it is clear that rapid development toward a technological
form of society occurs only under special conditions. So
there is no reason to assume that a long-lasting technolo¬
gical regression cannot be brought about.

212. Would society EVENTUALLY develop again toward
an industrial-technological form? Maybe, but there is no
use in worrying about it, since we can’t predict or control
events 500 or 1,000 years in the future. Those problems
must be dealt with by the people who will live at that
time.


THE DANGER OF LEFTISM

213. Because of their need for rebellion and for mem¬
bership in a movement, leftists or persons of similar psy¬
chological type often are unattracted to a rebellious or
activist movement whose goals and membership are not
initially leftist. The resulting influx of leftish types can ea¬
sily turn a non-leftist movement into a leftist one, so that
leftist goals replace or distort the original goals of the mo¬
vement.

214. To avoid this, a movement that exalts nature
and opposes technology must take a resolutely anti-leftist


27



stance and must avoid all collaboration with leftists. Lef¬
tism is in the long run inconsistent with wild nature, with
human freedom and with the elimination of modern tech¬
nology. Leftism is collectivist; it seeks to bind together the
entire world (both nature and the human race) into a uni¬
fied whole. But this implies management of nature and
of human life by organized society, and it requires advan¬
ced technology. You can’t have a united world without ra¬
pid transportation and communication, you can’t make all
people love one another without sophisticated psychologi¬
cal techniques, you can’t have a “planned society” without
the necessary technological base. Above all, leftism is dri¬
ven by the need for power, and the leftist seeks power
on a collective basis, through identification with a mass
movement or an organization. Leftism is unlikely ever to
give up technology, because technology is too valuable a
source of collective power.

215. The anarchist [34] too seeks power, but he seeks
it on an individual or small-group basis; he wants indivi¬
duals and small groups to be able to control the circum¬
stances of their own lives. He opposes technology because
it makes small groups dependent on large organizations.

216. Some leftists may seem to oppose technology, but
they will oppose it only so long as they are outsiders and
the technological system is controlled by non-leftists. If
leftism ever becomes dominant in society, so that the tech¬
nological system becomes a tool in the hands of leftists,
they will enthusiastically use it and promote its growth. In
doing this they will be repeating a pattern that leftism has
shown again and again in the past. When the Bolsheviks in
Russia were outsiders, they vigorously opposed censorship
and the secret police, they advocated self-determination
for ethnic minorities, and so forth; but as soon as they
came into power themselves, they imposed a tighter cen¬
sorship and created a more ruthless secret police than any
that had existed under the tsars, and they oppressed eth¬
nic minorities at least as much as the tsars had done. In
the United States, a couple of decades ago when leftists
were a minority in our universities, leftist professors were
vigorous proponents of academic freedom, but today, in
those of our universities where leftists have become do¬
minant, they have shown themselves ready to take away
from everyone else’s academic freedom. (This is “politi¬
cal correctness.”) The same will happen with leftists and
technology: They will use it to oppress everyone else if
they ever get it under their own control.

217. In earlier revolutions, leftists of the most power-
hungry t5q3e, repeatedly, have first cooperated with non¬
leftist revolutionaries, as well as with leftists of a more li¬
bertarian inclination, and later have double-crossed them
to seize power for themselves. Robespierre did this in the
French Revolution, the Bolsheviks did it in the Russian Re¬
volution, the communists did it in Spain in 1938 and Cas¬
tro and his followers did it in Cuba. Given the past history
of leftism, it would be utterly foolish for non-leftist revo¬
lutionaries today to collaborate with leftists.

218. Various thinkers have pointed out that leftism is a
kind of religion. Leftism is not a religion in the strict sense
because leftist doctrine does not postulate the existence of
any supernatural being. But, for the leftist, leftism plays a


psychological role much like that which religion plays for
some people. The leftist NEEDS to believe in leftism; it
plays a vital role in his psychological economy. His beliefs
are not easily modified by logic or facts. He has a deep
conviction that leftism is morally Right with a capital R,
and that he has not only a right but a duty to impose lef¬
tist morality on everyone. (However, many of the people
we are referring to as “leftists” do not think of themselves
as leftists and would not describe their system of beliefs as
leftism. We use the term “leftism” because we don’t know
of any better words to designate the spectrum of related
creeds that includes the feminist, gay rights, political cor¬
rectness, etc., movements, and because these movements
have a strong affinity with the old left. See paragraphs
227-230.)

219. Leftism is a totalitarian force. Wherever leftism is
in a position of power it tends to invade every private cor¬
ner and force every thought into a leftist mold. In part
this is because of the quasi-religious character of leftism:
everything contrary to leftist beliefs represents Sin. More
importantly, leftism is a totalitarian force because of the
leftists’ drive for power. The leftist seeks to satisfy his need
for power through identification with a social movement
and he tries to go through the power process by helping
to pursue and attain the goals of the movement (see pa¬
ragraph 83). But no matter how far the movement has
gone in attaining its goals the leftist is never satisfied, be¬
cause his activism is a surrogate activity (see paragraph
41). That is, the leftist’s real motive is not to attain the os¬
tensible goals of leftism; in reality he is motivated by the
sense of power he gets from struggling for and then rea¬
ching a social goal. [35] Consequently the leftist is never
satisfied with the goals he has already attained; his need
for the power process leads him always to pursue some
new goal. The leftist wants equal opportunities for mino¬
rities. When that is attained he insists on statistical equa¬
lity of achievement by minorities. And as long as anyone
harbors in some corner of his mind a negative attitude
toward some minority, the leftist has to re-educated him.
And ethnic minorities are not enough; no one can be allo¬
wed to have a negative attitude toward homosexuals, di¬
sabled people, fat people, old people, ugly people, and on
and on and on. It’s not enough that the public should be
informed about the hazards of smoking; a warning has to
be stamped on every package of cigarettes. Then cigarette
advertising has to be restricted if not banned. The activists
will never be satisfied until tobacco is outlawed, and after
that it will be alcohol, then junk food, etc. Activists have
fought gross child abuse, which is reasonable. But now
they want to stop all spanking. When they have done that
they will want to ban something else they consider unw¬
holesome, then another thing and then another. They will
never be satisfied until they have complete control over
all child rearing practices. And then they will move on to
another cause.

220. Suppose you asked leftists to make a list of ALL
the things that were wrong with society, and then suppose
you instituted EVERY social change that they demanded.
It is safe to say that within a couple of years the majority
of leftists would find something new to complain about.


28



some new social “evil” to correct; because, once again,
the leftist is motivated less by distress at society’s ills than
by the need to satisfy his drive for power by imposing his
solutions on society.

221. Because of the restrictions placed on their thoughts
and behavior by their high level of socialization, many lef¬
tists of the over-socialized t 5 ^e cannot pursue power in
the ways that other people do. For them the drive for po¬
wer has only one morally acceptable outlet, and that is in
the struggle to impose their morality on everyone.

222. Leftists, especially those of the oversocialized type,
are True Believers in the sense of Eric Hoffer’s book. The
True Believer. But not all True Believers are of the same
psychological type as leftists. Presumably a true-believing
nazi, for instance, is very different psychologically from a
true-believing leftist. Because of their capacity for single-
minded devotion to a cause. True Believers are a useful,
perhaps a necessary, ingredient of any revolutionary mo¬
vement. This presents a problem with which we must ad¬
mit we don’t know how to deal. We aren’t sure how to
harness the energies of the True Believer to a revolution
against technology. At present all we can say is that no
True Believer will make a safe recruit to the revolution
unless his commitment is exclusively to the destruction of
technology. If he is committed also to another ideal, he
may want to use technology as a tool for pursuing that
other ideal (see paragraphs 200, 201).

223. Some readers may say, “This stuff about leftism is
a lot of crap. I know John and Jane who are leftish types
and they don’t have all these totalitarian tendencies.” It’s
quite true that many leftists, possibly even a numerical
majority, are decent people who sincerely believe in tole¬
rating others’ values (up to a point) and wouldn’t want
to use high-handed methods to reach their social goals.
Our remarks about leftism are not meant to apply to every
individual leftist but to describe the general character of
leftism as a movement. And the general character of a
movement is not necessarily determined by the numeri¬
cal proportions of the various kinds of people involved in
the movement.

224. The people who rise to positions of power in leftist
movements tend to be leftists of the most power-hungry
type, because power-hungry people are those who strive
hardest to get into positions of power. Once the power-
hungry types have captured control of the movement,
there are many leftists of a gentler breed who inwardly
disapprove of many of the actions of the leaders, but can¬
not bring themselves to oppose them. They NEED their
faith in the movement, and because they cannot give up
this faith they go along with the leaders. True, SOME lef¬
tists do have the guts to oppose the totalitarian tendencies
that emerge, but they generally lose, because the power-
hungry types are better organized, are more ruthless and
Machiavellian and have taken care to build themselves a
strong power base.

225. These phenomena appeared clearly in Russia and
other countries that were taken over by leftists. Similarly,
before the breakdown of communism in the, USSR, lef¬
tish types in the West would, seldom criticize that coun¬
try. If prodded they would admit that the USSR did many


wrong things, but then they would try to find excuses for
the communists and begin talking about the faults of the
West. They always opposed Western military resistance
to communist aggression. Leftish types all over the world
vigorously protested the U.S. military action in Vietnam,
but when the USSR invaded Afghanistan they did nothing.
Not that they approved of the Soviet actions; but because
of their leftist faith, they just couldn’t bear to put them¬
selves in opposition to communism. Today, in those of our
universities where “political correctness” has become do¬
minant, there are probably many leftish types who priva¬
tely disapprove of the suppression of academic freedom,
but they go along with it an 3 nvay.

226. Thus the fact that many individual leftists are per¬
sonally mild and fairly tolerant people by no means pre¬
vents leftism as a whole form having a totalitarian ten¬
dency.

227. Our discussion of leftism has a serious weakness. It
is still far from clear what we mean by the word “leftist.”
There doesn’t seem to be much we can do about this. To¬
day leftism is fragmented into a whole spectrum of activist
movements. Yet not all activist movements are leftist, and
some activist movements (e.g., radical environmentalism)
seem to include both personalities of the leftist type and
personalities of thoroughly un-leftist types who ought to
know better than to collaborate with leftists. Varieties of
leftists fade out gradually into varieties of non-leftists and
we ourselves would often be hard-pressed to decide whe¬
ther a given individual is or is not a leftist. To the extent
that it is defined at all, our conception of leftism is defined
by the discussion of it that we have given in this article,
and we can only advise the reader to use his own judg¬
ment in deciding who is a leftist.

228. But it will be helpful to list some criteria for diag¬
nosing leftism. These criteria cannot be applied in a cut
and dried manner. Some individuals may meet some of
the criteria without being leftists, some leftists may not
meet any of the criteria. Again, you just have to use your
judgment.

229. The leftist is oriented toward large-scale collecti¬
vism. He emphasizes the duty of the individual to serve
society and the duty of society to take care of the indi¬
vidual. He has a negative attitude toward individualism.
He often takes a moralistic tone. He tends to be for gun
control, for sex education and other psychologically “en¬
lightened” educational methods, for social planning, for
affirmative action, for multiculturalism. He tends to iden¬
tify with victims. He tends to be against competition and
against violence, but he ofte finds excuses for those lef¬
tists who do commit violence. He is fond of using the
common catch-phrases of the left, like “racism,” “sexism,”
“homophobia,” “capitalism,” “imperialism,” “neocolonia¬
lism,” “genocide,” “social change,” “social justice,” “so¬
cial responsibility.” Maybe the best diagnostic trait of the
leftist is his tendency to sympathize with the following
movements: feminism, gay rights, ethnic rights, disability
rights, animal rights, political correctness. Anyone who
strongly S 3 mipathizes with ALL of these movements is al¬
most certainly a leftist. [36]

230. The more dangerous leftists, that is, those who


29



are most power-hungry, are often characterized by arro¬
gance or by a dogmatic approach to ideology. However,
the most dangerous leftists of all may be certain oversocia¬
lized t 5 ^es who avoid irritating displays of aggressiveness
and refrain from advertising their leftism, but work quietly
and unobtrusively to promote collectivist values, “enligh¬
tened” psychological techniques for socializing children,
dependence of the individual on the system, and so forth.
These crypto-leftists (as we may call them) approximate
certain bourgeois types as far as practical action is concer¬
ned, but differ from them in psychology, ideology and mo¬
tivation. The ordinary bourgeois tries to bring people un¬
der control of the system in order to protect his way of life,
or he does so simply because his attitudes are conventio¬
nal. The crypto-leftist tries to bring people under control
of the system because he is a True Believer in a collec-
tivistic ideology. The crypto-leftist is differentiated from
the average leftist of the oversocialized t5q5e by the fact
that his rebellious impulse is weaker and he is more se¬
curely socialized. He is differentiated from the ordinary
well-socialized bourgeois by the fact that there is some
deep lack within him that makes it necessary for him to
devote himself to a cause and immerse himself in a collec¬
tivity. And maybe his (well-sublimated) drive for power is
stronger than that of the average bourgeois.


FINAL NOTE

231. Throughout this article we’ve made imprecise sta¬
tements and statements that ought to have had all sorts
of qualifications and reservations attached to them; and
some of our statements may be flatly false. Lack of suf¬
ficient information and the need for brevity made it im¬
possible for us to formulate our assertions more precisely
or add all the necessary qualifications. And of course in
a discussion of this kind one must rely heavily on intui¬
tive judgment, and that can sometimes be wrong. So we
don’t claim that this article expresses more than a crude
approximation to the truth.

232. All the same, we are reasonably confident that the
general outlines of the picture we have painted here are
roughly correct. Just one possible weak point needs to be
mentioned. We have portrayed leftism in its modern form
as a phenomenon peculiar to our time and as a s 3 miptom
of the disruption of the power process. But we might pos¬
sibly be wrong about this. Oversocialized t5q5es who try to
satisfy their drive for power by imposing their morality on
everyone have certainly been around for a long time. But
we THINK that the decisive role played by feelings of infe¬
riority, low self-esteem, powerlessness, identification with
victims by people who are not themselves victims, is a pe¬
culiarity of modern leftism. Identification with victims by
people not themselves victims can be seen to some extent
in 19th century leftism and early Christianity, but as far as
we can make out, s 3 miptoms of low self-esteem, etc., were
not nearly so evident in these movements, or in any other
movements, as they are in modern leftism. But we are not
in a position to assert confidently that no such movements


have existed prior to modern leftism. This is a significant
question to which historians ought to give their attention.


NOTES

1. (Paragraph 19) We are asserting that ALL, or even
most, bullies and ruthless competitors suffer from feelings
of inferiority.

2. (Paragraph 25) During the Victorian period many
oversocialized people suffered from serious psychological
problems as a result of repressing or trying to repress their
sexual feelings. Freud apparently based his theories on
people of this t5q5e. Today the focus of socialization has
shifted from sex to aggression.

3. (Paragraph 27) Not necessarily including specialists
in engineering or the “hard” sciences.

4. (Paragraph 28) There are many individuals of the
middle and upper classes who resist some of these values,
but usually their resistance is more or less covert. Such re¬
sistance appears in the mass media only to a very limited
extent. The main thrust of propaganda in our society is
in favor of the stated values. The main reason why these
values have become, so to speak, the official values of our
society is that they are useful to the industrial system. Vio¬
lence is discouraged because it disrupts the functioning of
the system. Racism is discouraged because ethnic conflicts
also disrupt the system, and discrimination wastes the ta¬
lents of minority-group members who could be useful to
the system. Poverty must be “cured” because the under¬
class causes problems for the system and contact with the
underclass lowers the morale of the other classes. Women
are encouraged to have careers because their talents are
useful to the system and, more importantly, because by
having regular jobs women become better integrated into
the system and tied directly to it rather than to their fami¬
lies. This helps to weaken family solidarity. (The leaders
of the system say they want to strengthen the family, but
they really mean is that they want the family to serve as
an effective tool for socializing children in accord with the
needs of the system. We argue in paragraphs 51, 52 that
the system cannot afford to let the family or other small-
scale social groups be strong or autonomous.)

5. (Paragraph 42) It may be argued that the majority
of people don’t want to make their own decisions but
want leaders to do their thinking for them. There is an
element of truth in this. People like to make their own de¬
cisions in small matters, but making decisions on difficult,
fundamental questions requires facing up to psychologi¬
cal conflict, and most people hate psychological conflict.
Hence they tend to lean on others in making difficult de¬
cisions. But it does not follow that they like to have deci¬
sions imposed upon them without having any opportunity
to influence those decisions. The majority of people are
natural followers, not leaders, but they like to have di¬
rect personal access to their leaders, they want to be able
to influence the leaders and participate to some extent in
making even the difficult decisions. At least to that degree
they need autonomy.


30



6. (Paragraph 44) Some of the symptoms listed are si¬
milar to those shown by caged animals. To explain how
these symptoms arise from deprivation with respect to the
power process: common-sense understanding of human
nature tells one that lack of goals whose attainment re¬
quires effort leads to boredom and that boredom, long
continued, often leads eventually to depression. Failure
to attain goals leads to frustration and lowering of self¬
esteem. Frustration leads to anger, anger to aggression,
often in the form of spouse or child abuse. It has been
shown that long-continued frustration commonly leads to
depression and that depression tends to cause guilt, sleep
disorders, eating disorders and bad feelings about oneself
Those who are tending toward depression seek pleasure
as an antidote; hence insatiable hedonism and excessive
sex, with perversions as a means of getting new kicks. Bo¬
redom too tends to cause excessive pleasure-seeking since,
lacking other goals, people often use pleasure as a goal.

The foregoing is a simplification. Reality is more com¬
plex, and of course, deprivation with respect to the power
process is not the ONLY cause of the symptoms descri¬
bed. By the way, when we mention depression we do not
necessarily mean depression that is severe enough to be
treated by a psychiatrist. Often only mild forms of depres¬
sion are involved. And when we speak of goals we do not
necessarily mean long-term, thought-out goals. For many
or most people through much of human history, the goals
of a hand-to-mouth existence (merely providing oneself
and one’s family with food from day to day) have been
quite sufficient.

7. (Paragraph 52) A partial exception may be made for
a few passive, inwardlooking groups, such as the Amish,
which have little effect on the wider society. Apart from
these, some genuine small-scale communities do exist in
America today. For instance, youth gangs and “cults.” Eve¬
ryone regards them as dangerous, and so they are, be¬
cause the members of these groups are loyal primarily
to one another rather than to the system, hence the sys¬
tem cannot control them. Or take the gypsies. The gypsies
commonly get away with theft and fraud because their
loyalties are such that they can always get other gypsies
to give testimony that “proves” their innocence. Obviously
the system would be in serious trouble if too many people
belonged to such groups. Some of the early-20th century
Chinese thinkers who were concerned with modernizing
China recognized the necessity breaking down small-scale
social groups such as the family: “(According to Sun Yat-
sen) the Chinese people needed a new surge of patrio¬
tism, which would lead to a transfer of loyalty from the
family to the state.... (According to Li Huang) traditional
attachments, particularly to the family had to be abando¬
ned if nationalism were to develop in China.” (Chester C.
Tan, “Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century,”
page 125, page 297.)

8. (Paragraph 56) Yes, we know that 19th century Ame¬
rica had its problems, and serious ones, but for the sake of
brevity we have to express ourselves in simplified terms.

9. (Paragraph 61) We leave aside the “underclass.” We
are speaking of the mainstream.

10. (Paragraph 62) Some social scientists, educators.


“mental health” professionals and the like are doing their
best to push the social drives into group 1 by trying to see
to it that everyone has a satisfactory social life.

11. (Paragraphs 63, 82) Is the drive for endless mate¬
rial acquisition really an artificial creation of the adverti¬
sing and marketing industry? Certainly there is no innate
human drive for material acquisition. There have been
many cultures in which people have desired little material
wealth beyond what was necessary to satisfy their basic
physical needs (Australian aborigines, traditional Mexi¬
can peasant culture, some African cultures). On the other
hand there have also been many pre-industrial cultures in
which material acquisition has played an important role.
So we can’t claim that toda/s acquisition-oriented culture
is exclusively a creation of the advertising and marketing
industry. But it is clear that the advertising and marke¬
ting industry has had an important part in creating that
culture. The big corporations that spend millions on ad¬
vertising wouldn’t be spending that kind of money wi¬
thout solid proof that they were getting it back in in¬
creased sales. One member of FC met a sales manager
a couple of years ago who was frank enough to tell him,
“Our job is to make people buy things they don’t want
and don’t need.” He then described how an untrained no¬
vice could present people with the facts about a product,
and make no sales at all, while a trained and experien¬
ced professional salesman would make lots of sales to the
same people. This shows that people are manipulated into
buying things they don’t really want.

12. (Paragraph 64) The problem of purposelessness
seems to have become less serious during the last 15 years
or so, because people now feel less secure physically and
economically than they did earlier, and the need for se¬
curity provides them with a goal. But purposelessness has
been replaced by frustration over the difficulty of attai¬
ning security. We emphasize the problem of purposeless¬
ness because the liberals and leftists would wish to solve
our social problems by having society guarantee everyo¬
ne’s security; but if that could be done it would only bring
back the problem of purposelessness. The real issue is not
whether society provides well or poorly for people’s se¬
curity; the trouble is that people are dependent on the
system for their security rather than having it in their own
hands. This, by the way, is part of the reason why some
people get worked up about the right to bear arms; pos¬
session of a gun puts that aspect of their security in their
own hands.

13. (Paragraph 66) Conservatives’ efforts to decrease
the amount of government regulation are of little benefit
to the average man. For one thing, only a fraction of the
regulations can be eliminated because most regulations
are necessary. For another thing, most of the deregulation
affects business rather than the average individual, so that
its main effect is to take power from the government and
give it to private corporations. What this means for the
average man is that government interference in his life
is replaced by interference from big corporations, which
may be permitted, for example, to dump more chemicals
that get into his water supply and give him cancer. The
conservatives are just taking the average man for a sucker.


31



exploiting his resentment of Big Government to promote
the power of Big Business.

14. (Paragraph 73) When someone approves of the pur¬
pose for which propaganda is being used in a given case,
he generally calls it “education” or applies to it some simi¬
lar euphemism. But propaganda is propaganda regardless
of the purpose for which it is used.

15. (Paragraph 83) We are not expressing approval or
disapproval of the Panama invasion. We only use it to illus¬
trate a point.

16. (Paragraph 95) When the American colonies were
under British rule there were fewer and less effective le¬
gal guarantees of freedom than there were after the Ame¬
rican Constitution went into effect, yet there was more
personal freedom in pre-industrial America, both before
and after the War of Independence, than there was af¬
ter the Industrial Revolution took hold in this country. We
quote from “Violence in America: Historical and Compara¬
tive Perspectives,” edited by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted
Robert Gurr, Chapter 12 by Roger Lane, pages 476-478:
“The progressive heightening of standards of propriety,
and with it the increasing reliance on official law enfor¬
cement (in I9th century America)... were common to the
whole society.... [T]he change in social behavior is so long
term and so widespread as to suggest a connection with
the most fundamental of contemporary social processes;
that of industrial urbanization itself.... Massachusetts in
1835 had a population of some 660,940, 81 percent ru¬
ral, overwhelmingly preindustrial and native born. It’s ci¬
tizens were used to considerable personal freedom. Whe¬
ther teamsters, farmers or artisans, they were all accusto¬
med to setting their own schedules, and the nature of their
work made them physically independent of each other....
Individual problems, sins or even crimes, were not gene¬
rally cause for wider social concern...."But the impact of
the twin movements to the city and to the factory, both
just gathering force in 1835, had a progressive effect on
personal behavior throughout the 19th century and into
the 20th. The factory demanded regularity of behavior, a
life governed by obedience to the rh 3 n:hms of clock and
calendar, the demands of foreman and supervisor. In the
city or town, the needs of living in closely packed neigh¬
borhoods inhibited many actions previously unobjectio¬
nable. Both blue- and white-collar employees in larger es¬
tablishments were mutually dependent on their fellows;
as one man’s work fit into anther’s, so one man’s business
was no longer his own. The results of the new organiza¬
tion of life and work were apparent by 1900, when some
76 percent of the 2,805,346 inhabitants of Massachusetts
were classified as urbanites. Much violent or irregular be¬
havior which had been tolerable in a casual, independent
society was no longer acceptable in the more formalized,
cooperative atmosphere of the later period.... The move to
the cities had, in short, produced a more tractable, more
socialized, more ’civilized’ generation than its predeces¬
sors.”

17. (Paragraph 117) Apologists for the system are fond
of citing cases in which elections have been decided by
one or two votes, but such cases are rare.

18. (Paragraph 119) “Today, in technologically advan¬


ced lands, men live very similar lives in spite of geogra¬
phical, religious, and political differences. The daily lives
of a Ghristian bank clerk in Ghicago, a Buddhist bank clerk
in Tokyo, and a Gommunist bank clerk in Moscow are far
more alike than the life of any one of them is like that
of any single man who lived a thousand years ago. These
similarities are the result of a common technology...” L.
Sprague de Camp, “The Ancient Engineers,” Ballantine
edition, page 17. The lives of the three bank clerks are
not IDENTICAL. Ideology does have SOME effect. But all
technological societies, in order to survive, must evolve
along APPROXIMATELY the same trajectory.

19. (Paragraph 123) Just think an irresponsible genetic
engineer might create a lot of terrorists.

20. (Paragraph 124) For a further example of unde¬
sirable consequences of medical progress, suppose a re¬
liable cure for cancer is discovered. Even if the treatment
is too expensive to be available to any but the elite, it will
greatly reduce their incentive to stop the escape of carci¬
nogens into the environment.

21. (Paragraph 128) Since many people may find pa¬
radoxical the notion that a large number of good things
can add up to a bad thing, we illustrate with an analogy.
Suppose Mr. A is pla 3 dng chess with Mr. B. Mr. C, a Grand
Master, is looking over Mr. As shoulder. Mr. A of course
wants to win his game, so if Mr. C points out a good move
for him to make, he is doing Mr. A a favor. But suppose
now that Mr. C tells Mr. A how to make ALL of his moves.
In each particular instance he does Mr. A a favor by sho¬
wing him his best move, but by making ALL of his moves
for him he spoils his game, since there is not point in Mr.
As playing the game at all if someone else makes all his
moves. The situation of modern man is analogous to that
of Mr. A. The system makes an individual’s life easier for
him in innumerable ways, but in doing so it deprives him
of control over his own fate.

22. (Paragraph 137) Here we are considering only the
conflict of values within the mainstream. For the sake of
simplicity we leave out of the picture “outsider” values like
the idea that wild nature is more important than human
economic welfare.

23. (Paragraph 137) Self-interest is not necessarily MA¬
TERIAL self-interest. It can consist in fulfillment of some
psychological need, for example, by promoting one’s own
ideology or religion.

24. (Paragraph 139) A qualification: It is in the interest
of the system to permit a certain prescribed degree of free¬
dom in some areas. For example, economic freedom (with
suitable limitations and restraints) has proved effective in
promoting economic growth. But only planned, circum¬
scribed, limited freedom is in the interest of the system.
The individual must always be kept on a leash, even if the
leash is sometimes long (see paragraphs 94, 97).

25. (Paragraph 143) We don’t mean to suggest that the
efficiency or the potential for survival of a society has al¬
ways been inversely proportional to the amount of pres¬
sure or discomfort to which the society subjects people.
That certainly is not the case. There is good reason to be¬
lieve that many primitive societies subjected people to less
pressure than European society did, but European society


32



proved far more efficient than any primitive society and
always won out in conflicts with such societies because of
the advantages conferred by technology.

26. (Paragraph 147) If you think that more effective law
enforcement is unequivocally good because it suppresses
crime, then remember that crime as defined by the sys¬
tem is not necessarily what YOU would call crime. Today,
smoking marijuana is a “crime,” and, in some places in
the U.S., so is possession of an unregistered handgun. To¬
morrow, possession of ANY firearm, registered or not, may
be made a crime, and the same thing may happen with
disapproved methods of child-rearing, such as spanking.
In some countries, expression of dissident political opi¬
nions is a crime, and there is no certainty that this will
never happen in the U.S., since no constitution or politi¬
cal system lasts forever. If a society needs a large, power¬
ful law enforcement establishment, then there is some¬
thing gravely wrong with that society; it must be subjec¬
ting people to severe pressures if so many refuse to follow
the rules, or follow them only because forced. Many so¬
cieties in the past have gotten by with little or no formal
law-enforcement.

27. (Paragraph 151) To be sure, past societies have
had means of influencing human behavior, but these have
been primitive and of low effectiveness compared with the
technological means that are now being developed.

28. (Paragraph 152) However, some psychologists have
publicly expressed opinions indicating their contempt for
human freedom. And the mathematician Claude Shannon
was quoted in Omni (August 1987) as saying, “1 visualize
a time when we will be to robots what dogs are to humans,
and Tm rooting for the machines.”

29. (Paragraph 154) This is no science fiction! After wri¬
ting paragraph 154 we came across an article in Scien¬
tific American according to which scientists are actively
developing techniques for identffying possible future cri¬
minals and for treating them by a combination of biolo¬
gical and psychological means. Some scientists advocate
compulsory application of the treatment, which may be
available in the near future. (See “Seeking the Criminal
Element,” by W. Wayt Gibbs, Scientific American, March
1995.) Maybe you think this is okay because the treatment
would be applied to those who might become violent cri¬
minals. But of course it won’t stop there. Next, a treatment
will be applied to those who might become drunk drivers
(they endanger human life too), then perhaps to peel who
spank their children, then to environmentalists who sabo¬
tage logging equipment, eventually to anyone whose be¬
havior is inconvenient for the system.

30. (Paragraph 184) A further advantage of nature as
a counter-ideal to technology is that, in many people, na¬
ture inspires the kind of reverence that is associated with
religion, so that nature could perhaps be idealized on a re¬
ligious basis. It is true that in many societies religion has
served as a support and justification for the established
order, but it is also true that religion has often provided
a basis for rebellion. Thus it may be useful to introduce
a religious element into the rebellion against technology,
the more so because Western society today has no strong
religious foundation. Religion, nowadays either is used as


cheap and transparent support for narrow, short-sighted
selfishness (some conservatives use it this way), or even is
cynically exploited to make easy money (by many evange¬
lists), or has degenerated into crude irrationalism (funda¬
mentalist protestant sects, “cults”), or is simply stagnant
(Catholicism, main-line Protestantism). The nearest thing
to a strong, widespread, dynamic religion that the West
has seen in recent times has been the quasi-religion of lef¬
tism, but leftism today is fragmented and has no clear,
unified, inspiring goal. Thus there is a religious vacuum
in our society that could perhaps be filled by a religion fo¬
cused on nature in opposition to technology. But it would
be a mistake to try to concoct artificially a religion to fill
this role. Such an invented religion would probably be a
failure. Take the “Gaia” religion for example. Do its adhe¬
rents REALLY believe in it or are they just play-acting? If
they are just play-acting their religion will be a flop in the
end. It is probably best not to try to introduce religion into
the conflict of nature vs. technology unless you REALLY
believe in that religion yourself and find that it arouses a
deep, strong, genuine response in many other people.

31. (Paragraph 189) Assuming that such a final push
occurs. Conceivably the industrial system might be elimi¬
nated in a somewhat gradual or piecemeal fashion (see
paragraphs 4, 167 and Note 32).

32. (Paragraph 193) It is even conceivable (remotely)
that the revolution might consist only of a massive change
of attitudes toward technology resulting in a relatively
gradual and painless disintegration of the industrial sys¬
tem. But if this happens we’ll be very lucky. It’s far more
probably that the transition to a nontechnological society
will be very difficult and full of conflicts and disasters.

33. (Paragraph 195) The economic and technological
structure of a society are far more important than its po¬
litical structure in determining the way the average man
lives (see paragraphs 95, 119 and Notes 16, 18).

34. (Paragraph 215) This statement refers to our par¬
ticular brand of anarchism. A wide variety of social at¬
titudes have been called “anarchist,” and it may be that
many who consider themselves anarchists would not ac¬
cept our statement of paragraph 215. It should be noted,
by the way, that there is a nonviolent anarchist movement
whose members probably would not accept PC as anar¬
chist and certainly would not approve of PC’s violent me¬
thods.

35. (Paragraph 219) Many leftists are motivated also by
hostility, but the hostility probably results in part from a
frustrated need for power.

36. (Paragraph 229) It is important to understand that
we mean someone who S3mipathizes with these move¬
ments as they exist today in our society. One who believes
that women, homosexuals, etc., should have equal rights
is not necessary a leftist. The feminist, gay rights, etc., mo¬
vements that exist in our society have the particular ideo¬
logical tone that characterizes leftism, and if one believes,
for example, that women should have equal rights it does
not necessarily follow that one must sympathize with the
feminist movement as it exists today.

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